European
Court of Human Rights
SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF TURAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Applications
nos. 75805/16 and
426 others – see appended list)
JUDGMENT
Art 5 § 1 •
Lawful detention • Pre-trial detention of judges suspected of membership of an
illegal organisation following a coup attempt, on the basis of an unreasonable
extension of the concept of in flagrante delicto
STRASBOURG
23 November
2021
This judgment
will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Turan and Others
v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Egidijus Kūris,
Branko Lubarda,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Marko Bošnjak,
Saadet Yüksel, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard
to:
the
applications (nos. 75805/16 and
426 others– see appended list) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the
Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 427 Turkish nationals (“the
applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision
to give notice to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) of the complaints
under Article 5 §§ 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible
the remainder of the applications;
the parties’
observations;
Having
deliberated in private on 19 October 2021,
Delivers the
following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The
present applications mainly concern the arrest and pre-trial detention of the
applicants – all of whom were sitting as judges or prosecutors at different
types and/or levels of court at the material time – on suspicion of their
membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terrorist
Organisation / Parallel State Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü /
Paralel Devlet Yapılanması, hereinafter referred to as “FETÖ/PDY”),
in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.
THE FACTS
2. A
list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. At the time of the events
giving rise to the present applications, they were members of the Court of
Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court, or served as judges in lower
courts (hereinafter referred to as “ordinary judges”) or as prosecutors.
3. Some
of the applicants were represented by lawyers, whose names are listed
in the appendix. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr
Hacı Ali Açıkgül, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Turkey.
4. The
facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
- BACKGROUND TO THE CASE
5. During
the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces
calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a
military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically installed National
Assembly, government and President of Turkey. Further information regarding the
events of that night may be found in the case of Baş
v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, § 7, 3 March 2020).
6. The
day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the
attempt on the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in
Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of
FETÖ/PDY.
7. On 16 July 2016
the Bureau for Crimes against the Constitutional
Order at the Ankara public prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal
investigation ex proprio motu into, inter alios,
the suspected members of FETÖ/PDY within the judiciary. According to the
information provided by the Government, this investigation against judges and
prosecutors, including members of high courts, was
initiated in accordance with the provisions of the ordinary law, on the ground
that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling
with the jurisdiction of the assize courts.
8. In instructions issued to the Directorate
General of Security on the same day, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor noted
that the offence of attempting to overthrow the government and the
constitutional order by force was still ongoing and that there was a risk that
members of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation who were suspected of committing
the offence in question might flee the country. He asked the Directorate
General of Security to contact all the regional authorities with a view to
taking into police custody all the judges and public prosecutors whose names
were listed in the appendix to the instructions – including some of the
applicants –, and to ensure that they were brought before a public
prosecutor to be placed in pre-trial detention under Article 309 of the
Criminal Code.
9. On
20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a period of three
months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended
for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers.
10. On
21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15
(for the contents of the notice, see Alparslan
Altan v. Turkey, no. 12778/17, § 66, 16 April 2019, or Baş,
cited above, § 109).
11. During the state of emergency, the Council of
Ministers passed several legislative decrees under Article 121 of the
Constitution (see Baş, cited above, §
52). One of them, Legislative Decree no. 667, published in the
Official Gazette on 23 July 2016, provided in its Article 3 that the High
Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu ‑“the
HSYK”) was authorised to dismiss any judges or prosecutors who were considered
to belong or to be affiliated or linked to terrorist organisations or
organisations, structures or groups found by the National Security Council to
have engaged in activities harmful to national security.
12. On
18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted.
- Suspensions and dismissals
- Suspensions of ordinary judges and prosecutors
13. On
16 July 2016 the 3rd Chamber of the HSYK noted that, in accordance with the instructions
of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor, a criminal investigation had been
initiated in respect of judges and prosecutors suspected of being members of
FETÖ/PDY (see paragraph 7 above). It decided to submit a proposal to the
chairman of the HSYK to approve the opening of an investigation, in accordance
with section 82 of Law no. 2802 on judges and prosecutors (“Law
no. 2802”) (see Baş, cited above, § 67, for the
relevant section of Law no. 2802).
14. On
the same day, the 2nd Chamber of the HSYK held an extraordinary meeting. It
noted that the proposal by the 3rd Chamber for the opening of an investigation
had been accepted by the chairman of the HSYK and that the presidency of the
Inspection Board of the Ministry of Justice had appointed a chief inspector. On
the basis of the report drawn up by the chief inspector, the 2nd Chamber
of the HSYK suspended 2,735 judges and prosecutors – including some of the
applicants – from their duties for a period of three months, pursuant to
sections 77(1) and 81(1) of Law no. 2802, on the grounds that there was
strong suspicion that they were members of the terrorist organisation that had
instigated the attempted coup and that keeping them in their posts would hinder
the progress of the investigation and undermine the authority and reputation of
the judiciary. Its decision was based on information and documents in the
investigation files that it had been sent prior to the coup attempt and on
information obtained following research by the intelligence services. Further
details regarding the HSYK’s decision may be found in the Baş case
(ibid., §§ 17-20).
15. It
appears from the information provided by the Government that by decisions taken
on 19 and 22 July, 10 August and 13 October 2016, the HSYK decided to
suspend more judges and prosecutors from their duties –including some of the
applicants – on grounds similar to those in its earlier decision of
16 July 2016.
- Suspensions of members of the Court of
Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court
16. On
17 July 2016 the 1st Presidency Board of the Court of Cassation issued a
decision (no. 244/a) revoking the existing authorities of the members of the
Court of Cassation whose names had been indicated by the Chief Public
Prosecutor’s Office, including some of the applicants. A similar decision
(no. 2016/27)
was taken by the Presidency Board of the Supreme Administrative Court on the
same date in respect of its members concerned, including, once again, some of
the applicants.
- Dismissals
17. On
24 August 2016, applying Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 667 (noted in
paragraph 11 above), the plenary HSYK dismissed 2,847 judges and prosecutors –
including many of the applicants – considered to be members of or affiliated or
linked to FETÖ/PDY (decision no. 2016/426). The HSYK found that the position of
the judges and prosecutors concerned within structures that were incompatible
with the principles of independence and impartiality and their activities
within the organisation’s hierarchy, coupled with their underlying sense of
allegiance, were likely to undermine the reputation and authority of the
judiciary. It held that the fact that judges and prosecutors obeyed the instructions
of a hierarchical structure outside the State apparatus presented a genuine
obstacle to the right of citizens to a fair trial.
18. According
to the information provided by the parties, a total of a further
1,393 judges and prosecutors were dismissed from the profession in the
following months, including some of the applicants.
- APPLICANTS’ ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
- Decisions for the applicants’ arrest and
pre-trial detention
19. Acting
on the instructions of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office (see
paragraph 8 above), regional and provincial prosecutors’ offices initiated
criminal investigations in respect of individuals suspected of being involved
in the coup attempt and/or alleged to have links to the FETÖ/PDY organisation,
including the applicants.
20. Following
their arrest and detention in police custody, the applicants were placed in
pre-trial detention on various dates between 18 July 2016 and
19 October 2016, mainly on suspicion of membership of the FETÖ/PDY
organisation, an offence punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code
(see Baş, cited above, § 58). The pre-trial detention orders
were issued by the magistrates’ courts located at the respective places of the
applicants’ arrest.
21. When
ordering the applicants’ pre-trial detention, the magistrates’ courts relied
mainly on the fact that the applicants had been suspended from their duties as
judges or prosecutors on the grounds of their membership of the organisation
that had instigated the attempted coup and that the Ankara Chief Public
Prosecutor’s Office had requested the launching of a criminal investigation in
their regard. The magistrates noted the existence of further incriminating
evidence in respect of some of the applicants, such as witness statements or
evidence suggesting their use of the ByLock messaging system. Regard being had
to the state of the evidence, the nature of the alleged offence or offences –
which were among the so-called ‘catalogue’ offences listed in
Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) –, the potential
sentences and the ongoing investigations into the coup attempt across the
country, the magistrates’ courts held that pre-trial detention was a
proportionate measure. In the majority of the decisions, it was noted
specifically that the criminal investigation was governed by the ordinary
rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused, namely
membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a ’continuing
offence’ (temadi olan suç) and that there was a case
of discovery in flagrante delicto governed by the relevant
provisions of domestic law (see Baş, cited above, § 67,
as regards the relevant section 94 of Law no. 2802, and
paragraphs 30 and 31 below as regards Laws nos. 2797 or 2575,
respectively).
22. On
different dates the magistrates’ courts dismissed the applicants’ objections
against the initial orders for their detention, mainly on the same grounds as
those indicated in the initial detention orders.
23. The
applicants’ continued pre-trial detention was reviewed automatically pursuant
to Article 108 of the CCP, which provides for a review every thirty days
(see Baş, cited above, § 62). Their requests for release were
examined at the same time as the automatic periodic review of their detention,
as provided under Article 3, paragraph 1 (ç), of Legislative
Decree no. 668 (ibid., § 81). The reviews, which were carried out on the
basis of the case files, were not conducted on an individual basis but
concerned a large group of suspects. Both the decisions to prolong the pre‑trial
detention and the dismissals of the applicants’ objections to their detention
essentially involved a repetition of the reasons put forth at the time of the
initial pre-trial detention.
- Decisions concerning the applicants’ continued
pre-trial detention, and their indictment, trial and conviction
24. According
to the information provided by the parties, on various dates the applicants
were charged with membership of a terrorist organisation under Article 314
§ 2 of the Criminal Code. During the subsequent trial stage, the first-instance
courts, ruling either at the scheduled hearings or at periodic reviews carried
out between the hearings, ordered the applicants’ continued detention and
dismissed their requests for release on grounds similar to those noted above.
25. According
to the latest information in the case file, the first-instance courts have
concluded their examinations regarding all applicants, except for a few. Most
of the applicants were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, and
some sixteen applicants were acquitted. For the most part, the appeal
proceedings are still pending before the regional courts of appeal or the Court
of Cassation, as relevant, except in the case of a few applicants whose
convictions or acquittals have become final.
- Individual applications to the Constitutional
Court
26. In
the meantime, the applicants lodged one or more individual applications with
the Constitutional Court in respect of, inter alia, the alleged
violation of their right to liberty and security on various accounts, all of
which were declared inadmissible.
27. Amongst the complaints lodged by the
applicants was the one concerning their detention in alleged breach of the
procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors in domestic law and
the lack of jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts that had ordered their
detention, which the Constitutional Court found to be inadmissible. It held
essentially that in view of the nature of the alleged offence and the manner in
which it had been committed, it had been appropriate to accept the jurisdiction
of the magistrates who had ordered the applicants’ detention. In many of the
decisions, it further stated expressly that there had been no error of
assessment or any arbitrariness as regards the application of the provisions
relating to discovery in flagrante delicto.
RELEVANT
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
- RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
28. The
relevant domestic law and practice, including the pertinent case‑law of
the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, have for the most part
been set out in the cases of Alparslan Altan v.
Turkey (cited above, §§ 46-48, 50-55 and 59-64) and Baş
v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 52‑67, 70, 81-90, 98-99,
101-103). Further elements of relevant domestic law and practice are summarised
below.
- Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (Law no. 5271)
29. The relevant parts of Article 141 § 1 of the
CCP provide:
“Compensation
for damage ... may be claimed from the State by anyone ...
(a) who
has been arrested or taken into or kept in detention under conditions or in
circumstances not complying with the law;
...
(d) who,
even if he or she was detained lawfully during the investigation or trial, has
not been brought before a judicial authority within a reasonable time and has
not obtained a judgment on the merits within a reasonable time;
(e) who,
after being arrested or detained in accordance with the law, was not
subsequently committed for trial or was acquitted; ...”
- Court of Cassation Act (Law no. 2797)
30. The relevant provision of the Court of
Cassation Act (Law no. 2797) provides:
Preliminary
examination, investigation and prosecution of offences
Personal and
duty-related offences
Section 46
“The opening
of an investigation against the First President, the first deputy presidents,
the chamber presidents and the members of the Court of Cassation, as well as
the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court
of Cassation, in respect of offences related to their official duties or
personal offences shall be subject to the decision of the First Presidency
Board. However, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling
within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial
investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of ordinary law.”
- Supreme Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575)
31. The relevant parts of the Supreme
Administrative Court Act (Law no. 2575) provide:
Investigation
Section 76
“1. The
initial investigation in respect of offences committed by the President, the
Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the
members of the Supreme Administrative Court in connection with or in the course
of their official duties shall be conducted by a committee composed of a
chamber president and two members selected by the President of the Supreme
Administrative Court.
...”
The procedure
for the prosecution of personal offences
Section 82
“1. The
proceedings regarding the personal offences committed by the President, the
Chief Public Prosecutor, the deputy presidents, the chamber presidents and the
members of the Supreme Administrative Court shall be conducted in accordance
with the provisions concerning the personal offences committed by the
President, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the members of the Court of
Cassation.
...”
- Case-law of the Court of Cassation
32. On 2 July 2019 the
plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment (E. 2019/9.MD-312,
K.2019/514) regarding a former member of the HSYK suspected of membership of
FETÖ/PDY, where it addressed, inter alia, the question of the
compatibility with domestic law of the conduct of the preliminary investigation
in accordance with the rules of ordinary law. After summarising its case law
relating to the elements of the offence of membership of an armed organisation,
which it noted was a personal offence, and to the notion of “continuing
offence” (see, in this regard, Baş, cited above, §§ 83-86 and
90), the Court of Cassation proceeded with the examination of the concept of “in
flagrante delicto” and its application in the context of continuing
offences. Referring to the prevalent view in Turkish legal doctrine, the Court
of Cassation held that continuing offences could be committed in
flagrante delicto, and that the situation of discovery in flagrante
delicto would persist in respect of continuing offences as long as the
offence continued to be committed. The Court of Cassation pronounced as
follows:
“... As
indicated as part of the general remarks regarding membership of an
organisation, in order to establish the presence of membership, it is
sufficient that the perpetrator continually submits (...) to the hierarchy of
the organisation by his concrete actions ... Accordingly, membership (...) does
not need to be demonstrated by other acts ... On the other hand, in the event
that the competent authorities have obtained evidence that raises a suspicion
that the perpetrator is a member of a criminal organisation, and that the
continuity of the membership can be established on the basis of that evidence
..., it is not contrary to the law to ... accept that the perpetrator had been
[caught] while committing the offence [in question], within the meaning of
Article 2 (j), paragraph 1 of the CCP, and that, therefore, [he or she]
may be subject to the terms of discovery in flagrante delicto. It
is not necessary here that the perpetrator’s criminal act be observed by the
general public; it is sufficient that the competent authorities know at the
time of arrest that the acts demonstrating the continuity of the membership of
the organisation persist and that the perpetrator had not left the
organisation.”
33. The
Court of Cassation held that contrary to the Court’s findings in the case
of Alparslan Altan, its interpretation
of the concept of “discovery in flagrante delicto” in the context
of the arrest of judges and prosecutors for alleged membership of FETÖ/PDY was
not based on an unreasonable and arbitrary judicial interpretation. Its
approach, which had also found acceptance by the Constitutional Court, was
rather grounded in doctrine, on the theory of organised crime and, above all,
on domestic legal provisions that had been enacted by the legislature in a
consistent and harmonious manner, which the Strasbourg Court had not taken into
account.
34. Referring
to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, the Court of Cassation further stated that in
view of their nature and gravity, the investigation of certain offences,
including that of membership of an armed organisation, would be conducted
directly by the public prosecutors in accordance with the terms of the ordinary
law, even if the offence was committed during, or in connection with, the
performance of an official duty. Accordingly, where such grave offences were
concerned, the requirements of Article 161 § 8 of the CCP would prevail and the
special investigatory procedures envisaged in certain laws – such as Law no.
2797 in respect of the members of the Court of Cassation –, would not be
applicable, regardless of whether there was a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto or not. The Court of Cassation contended that in
its Alparslan Altan judgment, the Court had failed to assess
the issue of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention from the standpoint of
Article 161 § 8 of the CCP.
35. The Court of Cassation concluded, in the light
of the foregoing, that the conduct of the investigation against the defendant
under the terms of the ordinary law had been in accordance with the relevant
legal framework, that it had not resulted from an extensive or arbitrary
interpretation of the law, and that it had thus been compatible with the
requirements of the “quality of law”.
- Case-law of the Constitutional Court
36. In a decision delivered on 8 May 2019, the
Constitutional Court examined a complaint relating to the alleged unlawfulness
of the pre-trial detention on 21 July 2016 of Selim Öztürk, who served as an ordinary
judge subject to Law no. 2802 at the material time. According to the
excerpt provided in the Constitutional Court’s decision, Mr Öztürk’s pre-trial
detention was ordered by the Ankara Magistrates’ Court on the basis of
Articles 100 and 101 of the CCP, without any specific reference to
section 94 of Law no. 2802 or to the existence of a situation of a
discovery in flagrante delicto. When upholding the lawfulness of
that detention order, the Constitutional Court nevertheless found that it was
factually and legally tenable to hold that the judge in question had been
caught in flagrante delicto, having regard to the Court of
Cassation’s consistent case-law on the matter, according to which the existence
of a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto was inferred
at the moment of the arrest of judges and prosecutors suspected of the offence
of membership of an armed terrorist organisation –, and to the fact that he had
been detained amid efforts to quell the coup attempt for membership of the organisation
behind that attempt.
37. On 4 June 2020 the Plenary of the
Constitutional Court delivered a decision of inadmissibility in the case
of Yıldırım Turan, which concerned the pre-trial
detention of an ordinary judge – subject to Law no. 2802 – in the aftermath of
the coup attempt on suspicion of membership of FETÖ/PDY. Like the present
applicants, the applicant in that case complained, inter alia, that
his pre-trial detention had been ordered without respect for the special
procedural guarantees granted to the members of the judiciary in his position
under Law no. 2802.
38. The
Constitutional Court stated at the outset that it had delivered many decisions
where it had addressed this issue, both in respect of the members of the high
courts (such as Alparslan Altan, no.
2016/15586, 11 January 2018, Salih Sönmez,
no. 2016/25431, 28 November 2018, and Hannan
Yılbaşı, no. 2016/37380, 17 July 2019, concerning
members of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court, respectively) and ordinary judges (such as Adem
Türkel, no. 2017/632, 23 January 2019). Relying on the relevant
legal framework and the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it had found in all
those decisions that the offence in question – that is, membership of an armed
terrorist organisation – was a personal offence of a continuing nature. This
effectively meant that the commission of the crime had been continuing at the
time of arrest, and that, therefore, there had been a situation entailing
discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction
of the assize courts in all the cases concerned, which had rendered
inapplicable the special procedural guarantees envisaged under different laws
governing the members of the judiciary in question.
39. In two further judgments delivered on 31
October 2019 (namely, A.B.,
no. 2016/22702, and Mustafa Özterzi, no. 2016/14597,
concerning a member of the Court of Cassation and an ordinary judge, respectively),
it had consolidated this case-law and had underlined the fact that the assessment regarding the existence of a situation of
discovery in flagrante delicto in the prevailing circumstances
could not be deemed unfounded, given that the persons arrested were considered
to have an organisational relation with FETÖ/PDY, which was behind the coup
attempt, and that the arrests had taken place at
a time when the efforts to avert that attempt were still ongoing and
the threat against national security and public order persisted. The
Constitutional Court therefore reiterated that in accepting the existence of a
case of discovery in flagrante delicto with respect to the
members of the judiciary arrested after the attempted coup, its main reference
point had been the coup attempt itself.
40. The
Constitutional Court then went on to review the judgment in the Baş case
(cited above), where the Court had found a violation of
Article 5 § 1 on the basis of its earlier conclusions in Alparslan
Altan (cited above) regarding the extensive interpretation of the
concept of in flagrante delicto by the domestic courts.
According to the Constitutional Court, the Court’s findings in that case
involved an assessment not of the application of the Convention, but of the interpretation
of the relevant Turkish law. While it acknowledged the binding nature of the
Court’s judgments, the Constitutional Court stressed that it was up to the
Turkish public authorities, and ultimately to the domestic courts, to interpret
the provisions of domestic law relating to the pre-trial detention of members
of the judiciary. It held that although the Court was entitled to consider
whether the interpretation given by Turkish courts to domestic law violated the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it should not replace the
domestic courts and interpret domestic law first-hand. It therefore deemed it
useful to recapitulate the relevant domestic legal framework and practice
governing the investigation and pre-trial detention of the members of the
judiciary.
41. The
Constitutional Court noted essentially that the existence of the element of
discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction
of the assize courts constituted an exception to the procedural
safeguards afforded to all judges and prosecutors, regardless of the level or
type of court in which they served. However, unlike the legal framework
governing the members of high courts and the elected judicial members of the
HSYK, where the distinction between personal and duty-related offences was
immaterial for the application of the relevant procedural safeguards, the
“personal offences” committed by ordinary judges and prosecutors within the
meaning of section 93 of Law no. 2802 would fall outside the
protection afforded to them under the same law by reason of their profession.
Measures taken in respect of such offences would therefore be subject to the
rules of ordinary law, whether there was a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto or not.
42. Accordingly,
when assessing the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge
or prosecutor in the present context, it was of decisive importance to
determine whether the offence attributed to him or her was a personal offence
or an offence committed during or in connection with the performance of duties.
Relying on a number of judgments delivered by the Court of Cassation in the
aftermath of the attempted coup, as well as its own relevant case-law from the
same period, it reiterated that the offence of membership of a terrorist
organisation could not be committed by public officials as part of their duties
and, for that reason, the initiation of a criminal investigation against Mr
Yıldırım Turan, and his pre-trial detention, were not subject to
authorisation by an administrative authority. There was, therefore, no legal
obstacle to his arrest pursuant to the terms of the ordinary law.
43. That being so, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the
question as to whether there was a case of discovery in flagrante
delicto within the meaning of section 94 of Law no. 2802 had no
bearing on the lawfulness of Mr Yıldırım Turan’s arrest,
but was only relevant for the determination of the judicial authority with
jurisdiction ratione loci to carry out the investigation and
order the pre-trial detention. It accordingly dismissed
Mr Yıldırım Turan’s allegation that his deprivation of
liberty had lacked a legal basis.
- INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL
44. The Government referred to Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member States, entitled
“Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities” and adopted on
17 November 2010. The relevant parts of the Recommendation have been noted
in the case of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 65).
45. They further brought to the Court’s attention
Opinion no. 3 of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) on the
“Principles and Rules Governing Judges’ Professional Conduct, in Particular
Ethics, Incompatible Behaviour and Impartiality”, dated 19 November 2002,
which provided as follows in its relevant part:
“Article 75:
As regards criminal liability, the CCJE considers that:
i) judges
should be criminally liable in ordinary law for offences committed outside
their judicial office;
...”
- NOTICE OF DEROGATION BY TURKEY
46. On
21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe
sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a notice of derogation
(see, for the text of the notice of derogation, Alparslan Altan,
cited above, § 66, or Baş, cited above, § 109).
47. The
notice of derogation was withdrawn on 8 August 2018, following the end of the
state of emergency.
- JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
48. Having
regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it
appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment, pursuant to Rule 42 §
1 of the Rules of Court.
- PRELIMINARY QUESTION CONCERNING THE DEROGATION
BY TURKEY
49. The
Government emphasised at the outset that all of the applicants’ complaints
should be examined with due regard to the derogation of which the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe had been notified on 21 July 2016
under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 provides:
“1. In
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under
[the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.
2. No
derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful
acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be
made under this provision.
3. Any
High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and
the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”
50. The
parties made submissions regarding the derogation under Article 15 of the
Convention along the same lines as those noted in the cases of Alparslan Altan v. Turkey (cited above, §§
68-70) and Baş v. Turkey (Baş v. Turkey,
cited above, §§ 112-114).
51. The
Court notes that in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17,
§ 93, 20 March 2018) it held, in the light of the Constitutional
Court’s findings on this point and all the other material in its possession,
that the attempted military coup had disclosed the existence of a “public
emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of the
Convention. With regard to the scope ratione temporis and ratione
materiae of the derogation by Turkey – a question which the Court
could raise of its own motion – the Court observes that the applicants were
detained a short time after the coup attempt, the event that prompted the
declaration of the state of emergency. It considers that this is undoubtedly a
contextual factor that should be fully taken into account in interpreting and
applying Article 5 of the Convention in the present case (see, mutatis
mutandis, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 29750/09, § 103, ECHR 2014, and Alparslan Altan, cited
above, § 75).
52. As
to whether the measures taken in the present case were strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under
international law, the Court considers it necessary to examine the applicants’
complaints on the merits (see Baş,
cited above, § 116).
- ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE LAWFULNESS OF THE APPLICANTS’ PRE-TRIAL
DETENTION
53. The
applicants complained mainly that they had been placed in pre-trial detention
in breach of the domestic law governing the arrest and pre-trial detention of
the members of the judiciary, and disputed that there had been a case of
discovery in flagrante delicto for the purposes of
section 94 of Law no. 2802 and section 46 of Law no. 2797. They
further argued that the magistrates’ courts had lacked competence and
territorial jurisdiction to decide on their detention.
54. The
Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article 5
§ 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:
“1. Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law: ...”
- Admissibility
- The parties’ submissions
55. The
Government urged the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicants who had not
made use of the relevant compensatory remedy under Article 141
§ 1 (a) of the CCP, which provided for an award of compensation to
anyone who had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty, as well as the
applicants whose claims under that provision were still pending before the
domestic courts. The Government further claimed that one of the applicants
(application no. 55057/17)
had been granted compensation pursuant to Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP
following his acquittal and had therefore lost his victim status. In the
Government’s view, any other applicants whose claims for compensation were
pending before the competent courts could similarly obtain redress and lose
their victim status, which the Court had to take into account in examining the
admissibility of their complaints. The Government lastly asked the Court to
declare the applications inadmissible for abuse of the right of application to
the extent that the applicants had not informed the Court of the developments
in their cases following the lodging of their applications.
56. The
applicants contested the Government’s arguments.
- The Court’s assessment
(a) Non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies
57. Referring
to the general principles developed in its case-law regarding the rule of
exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention (see, for instance, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC],
no. 40167/06, §§ 115-116, ECHR 2015), the Court reiterates firstly
that for a remedy in respect of the lawfulness of an ongoing deprivation of
liberty to be effective, it must offer a prospect of release (see Mustafa
Avcı v. Turkey, no. 39322/12, § 60, 23 May 2017). It
notes in this respect that it has already found that the remedy provided for in
Article 141 of the CCP is not capable of terminating the deprivation of
liberty (see, for instance, Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 84).
It therefore rejects the Government’s preliminary objection insofar as it
concerns the applicants who are still deprived of their liberty for the
purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
58. Secondly,
with regard to the remaining applicants who are no longer in pre-trial detention,
the Court recalls that where an applicant, who is no longer in detention,
complains that he or she was detained in breach of domestic law, a compensation
claim capable of leading to an acknowledgment of the alleged violation and an
award of compensation is in principle an effective remedy which needs to be
pursued if its effectiveness in practice has been convincingly established
(see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey
(no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 208, 22 December 2020).
59. The
Government do not dispute the fact that the applicants have challenged the
lawfulness of their pre-trial detention before various domestic instances,
including the Constitutional Court, and that on none of those occasions was the
unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention acknowledged (see paragraph 27
above). Moreover, the examples of case‑law provided by the Government
regarding the domestic courts’ interpretation of the concept of “in
flagranto delicto” in the present context demonstrate unequivocally that
the applicants’ detention in accordance with the ordinary law provisions, as
opposed to the special procedure pertaining to the detention of judges and
prosecutors envisaged under the applicable laws, was considered to be
compatible with the relevant domestic law by the highest courts of the land
(see the case-law cited in paragraphs 32-43 below).
60. The
Court considers, in the light of the foregoing, that a compensation claim under
Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP would have had no prospects of success in
respect of the applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 regarding the
unlawfulness of their pre-trial detention. Accordingly, the Court considers
that the applicants were not required to make use of that compensatory remedy
for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, for a similar
finding, Baş, cited above, § 121,
and Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, no. 23199/17,
§ 126, 10 November 2020). It therefore dismisses the Government’s
objection in this regard.
(b) Victim
status
61. As
for the question whether the applicant in application no. 55057/17 may
be considered to have lost his victim status on account of the compensation
awarded to him under Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP, the Court refers to its
consistent and well-established case-law to the effect that a favourable
decision or measure is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive applicants of
their status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention,
unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in
substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see,
among other authorities, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC],
no. 22978/05, § 115, ECHR 2010, and Alparslan Altan, cited
above, § 85).
62. The Court notes in
this connection that the award in question was made in view of the said
applicant’s acquittal and involved no acknowledgment of unlawfulness of his
pre-trial detention. The wording of Article 141 § 1 (e) of the CCP is
indeed very clear that compensation under that provision is awarded to those
who have been acquitted after being arrested or detained “in accordance with
the law”. For this reason, and bearing also in mind the assessment made in
paragraph 59 above regarding the domestic courts’ consistent approach to
the issue of “lawfulness” in the present context, the award made to the
applicant may not be considered as constituting an acknowledgement of the
alleged breach of the right to liberty and removing his victim status. For that
reason, the Court rejects the Government’s objection in this regard, both in
relation to application no. 55057/17 and
to any other applicants who may have in the meantime received compensation on
the same ground.
(c) Abuse
of the right of application
63. The
Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, an
application may be rejected for abuse if, among other reasons, it was knowingly
based on untrue facts (see X and Others v.
Bulgaria [GC], no. 22457/16, § 145, 2 February 2021).
Incomplete and therefore misleading information may also amount to abuse of the
right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of
the case and no sufficient explanation is given for the failure to disclose
that information (see, for instance, Predescu v.
Romania, no. 21447/03, § 25, 2 December 2008). The same applies
where new, significant developments occur during the proceedings before the
Court and where – despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 § 6 of
the Rules of Court – the applicant fails to disclose that information to the
Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the
facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant’s intention to mislead the
Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v.
Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012).
64. Having
examined the case files and the parties’ submissions in the light of the
foregoing principles, the Court does not find any indication to lead it to
conclude that the applicants have withheld information in a deliberate attempt
to mislead it, or have otherwise abused the right of petition in respect of
their complaint in question. The Government’s objection in that connection
should, therefore, be dismissed.
(d) Conclusion
65. The
Court notes accordingly that the applicants’ complaint regarding the lawfulness
of their pre-trial detention is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible
on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
- Merits
- The parties’ submissions
(a) The
applicants
66. The
applicants claimed that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in breach
of the special rules of procedure prescribed in domestic law in relation to the
arrest and pre-trial detention of the members of the judiciary.
67. The
observations submitted by the applicants who were subject to Law no. 2802
at the time of their detention – that is, ordinary judges and public
prosecutors – were largely along the same lines as those noted in the case
of Baş (cited above, §§ 133-135).
68. As
for the remaining applicants, who were members of the Court of Cassation and
the Supreme Administrative Court at the material time, they mainly noted that
under the relevant provisions governing their respective status – namely
section 46 of Law no. 2797 and section 76 of Law no. 2575 – the opening of
a criminal investigation in their regard was in principle subject to a decision
of their relevant Presidency Boards. They accepted that in cases of
discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the jurisdiction
of the assize courts, the preliminary and initial investigations in their
respect could be conducted under the rules of ordinary law, but contested the
finding that their detention involved a situation of discovery in
flagrante delicto. They therefore requested that the Court follow the
approach it had taken in its judgment in Alparslan Altan (cited
above). Some of the applicants stressed that while there was no doubt as to the
“continuing” nature of the offence of membership of an armed organisation under
Turkish law, the correlation made in the recent Court of Cassation judgments
between such offences and the notion of “discovery in flagrante delicto”
was quite far-fetched and even unlawful.
69. Some
applicants further added that the offence of which they had been accused could
only have been committed in connection with the performance of their official
duties, given that the offence was said to relate to judicial actions that they
had allegedly carried out under the instructions of the terrorist organisation
in question.
(b) The
Government
70. The
Government largely repeated the observations that they had lodged in the cases
of Alparslan Altan and Baş (both cited
above, §§ 92-98 and §§ 136-141 respectively), as relevant, and argued
that, contrary to the Court’s findings in those cases, the pre-trial detention
of the applicants had been in compliance with the applicable domestic
legislation.
71. The Government stated at the outset that
investigations had been initiated and detention orders had been issued
against the applicants pursuant to the general provisions of the CCP on the
basis of the consideration that there had been a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto. The Government explained in particular that although
Laws nos. 2797 and 2575 provided for a special procedure for conducting
criminal proceedings against members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court, in cases of discovery in flagrante delicto falling
within the assize courts’ jurisdiction, the investigations would be conducted
in accordance with the rules of ordinary law and it would be possible to order
preventive measures. Section 94 of Law no. 2802 pertaining to
ordinary judges and prosecutors similarly provided for the application of the
rules of ordinary law in the event of discovery in flagrante delicto falling
within the assize courts’ jurisdiction.
72. The Government noted that in the present
cases, the investigation conducted against the applicants had concerned their
suspected membership of an armed terrorist organisation under Article 314 § 2
of the Criminal Code, which fell within the jurisdiction of the assize courts.
They further noted that, in view of the “continuing” nature of the offence of
membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the magistrates’ courts had
found that there had been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto at
the time of the applicants’ arrest and had accordingly ordered their detention
in accordance with the rules of ordinary law – i.e. Articles 100 et seq. of the
CCP – as per the relevant provisions of Laws nos. 2797, 2575 and 2802. In the
context of the individual applications brought before it, the Constitutional
Court had moreover not accepted the applicants’ argument that the investigating
authorities’ assessment – that there had been a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto in respect of the offence of membership of a
terrorist organisation imputed to them – had lacked a factual and legal basis
and had thus been arbitrary. The Government therefore considered that the
primary issue to be resolved before the Court was whether there was a situation
of “in flagrante delicto” in respect of the
offence imputed to the applicants.
73. Noting that it was incumbent on the domestic
judicial authorities to interpret legal concepts provided in domestic law and
to determine their scope, the Government claimed that the decisions of the
magistrates’ courts at issue had been in accordance with the settled case-law
of the Court of Cassation. They referred in this connection to the
well-established practice of that court, according to which the offence of
membership of an armed terrorist organisation was a “continuing offence”
falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. They also referred to the
conclusion reached by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation
in a leading judgment of 10 October 2017 (E.2017/YYB-997, K.2017/404),
where it was held that “there is a situation of discovery in flagrante
delicto at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence
of membership of an armed organisation, and [consequently] the investigation
must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of ordinary law”
(see Alparslan Altan, cited above, § 63; for a similar
finding, see also the judgment delivered by the plenary criminal divisions of
the Court of Cassation on 26 September 2017 (E. 2017/16-956,
K. 2017/370), noted in Baş, cited above, § 88). The
Government emphasised in this regard that the Court of Cassation’s
jurisprudence on the matter was by no means a product of the post-15 July 2016
period, as that court had interpreted the concepts of “continuing offence” and
“in flagrante delicto” in a similar manner in cases that concerned the
offence of membership of terrorist organisations other than FETÖ/PDY and that
predated the cases at issue. The application of those concepts in the present
context had not, therefore, involved a new judicial interpretation that could
be regarded as arbitrary.
74. The Government
moreover stressed that in accepting the existence of “discovery in
flagrante delicto” in respect of the members of the judiciary placed in
detention subsequent to the coup attempt of 15 July, the Constitutional
Court had taken the coup attempt itself as its main reference point, rather
than the continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist
organisation, having regard to the fact that the judges concerned were arrested
at a time when the efforts to avert the coup attempt were still ongoing.
75. Referring
to the relevant international material (see paragraphs 44-45 above), the
Government further noted that judges and prosecutors were criminally liable for
offences committed outside their judicial office in the same way as any other
citizen. They submitted in this connection that the offence of which the
applicants had been accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist
organisation, was a personal offence, and not one that could be regarded as an
offence committed in connection with or in the course of official duties. They
relied in support of this argument on a judgment delivered on 28 September
2010 by the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation (E.2010/162‑K.210/179),
where the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which
the defendant had also been accused, had not been treated as an offence
committed in connection with or in the course of official duties (see, for
further information regarding that judgment, Baş, cited above,
§ 137).
76. The
Government acknowledged that Laws nos. 2797 and 2575 pertaining to the
members of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, as well
as Law no. 6216 governing the members of the Constitutional Court as outlined
by the Court in Alparslan Altan (cited above, §§ 49 and
106-107), did not differentiate between offences committed in an official or
personal capacity, and that the special procedures envisaged under the relevant
laws would apply in both circumstances, unless there had been a case of discovery in
flagrante delicto as indicated above. The situation was different,
however, in respect of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to the
provisions of Law no. 2802, which provided that personal offences governed by
section 93 would be treated in accordance with the requirements of the ordinary
law. Relying on the positions taken by the Court of Cassation and the
Constitutional Court in this regard (see, for instance, the references made
in Baş, cited above, § 137, and Alparslan Altan,
cited above, § 94, respectively, to the relevant courts’ case-law; see
also the judgments noted in paragraphs 32-43 above), the Government
therefore argued that even if the Court were to conclude that there had not
been a case of discovery in flagrante delicto in respect of
the ordinary judges and prosecutors in the present case, their detention would
still be subject to the rules of ordinary law by reason of the “personal”
nature of the offence imputed to them within the meaning of section 93 of
Law no. 2802. The Government therefore argued that the Court’s reliance
in Baş (cited above) on the conclusions that it had
previously made in Alparslan Altan (cited above), in disregard
of the clear distinction between the safeguards afforded to ordinary judges and
prosecutors and the members of the Constitutional Court, had been erroneous.
77. They
further emphasised in this regard that the decisions taken by the HSYK on 16
July 2016 and afterwards on the suspension of these judges and prosecutors from
office did not as such amount to an authorisation for the opening of a criminal
investigation due to a duty-related offence; those decisions rather pertained
to the disciplinary investigations initiated by the HSYK following the criminal
investigation launched ex proprio motu by the Ankara Chief
Public Prosecutor’s Office.
78. The Government lastly contended that
consideration should also be given to Article 161 § 8 of the CCP, which
provided that investigations into certain offences – including the offence of
membership of an armed terrorist organisation imputed to the applicants – would
be conducted directly by the public prosecutor pursuant to general provisions,
even if the offence had been committed in connection with or in the course of
official duties. In other words, Article 161 § 8 would bar the application of
the special procedural safeguards afforded to judges and prosecutors under
various laws.
- The Court’s assessment
79. The
Court refers at the outset to the relevant principles established in its
case-law regarding the right to liberty and security under
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, for instance, Alparslan
Altan, cited above, §§ 99-103, and Baş, cited above,
§ 143, and the cases cited therein).
80. It
reiterates in particular that where the “lawfulness” of detention is at issue,
including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been
followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the
obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. This
primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic
law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient:
Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of
liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from
arbitrariness. The Court must further ascertain in this connection whether
domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general
principles expressed or implied therein, notably the principle of legal
certainty (see Mooren v. Germany [GC],
no. 11364/03, § 72, 9 July 2009, with further references).
81. On
this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is
concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal
certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for
deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law
itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of
“lawfulness” set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be
sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with appropriate advice
– to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the
consequences which a given action may entail (see, for instance, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no.
16483/12, § 92, 15 December 2016, and the cases cited therein).
82. The
Court notes, moreover, that it has on many occasions emphasised the special
role in society of the judiciary, which, as the guarantor of justice, a fundamental
value in a State governed by the rule of law, must enjoy public confidence if
it is to be successful in carrying out its duties (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 164,
23 June 2016, with further references). This consideration, set out in
particular in cases concerning the right of judges to freedom of expression, is
equally relevant in relation to the adoption of a measure affecting the right
to liberty of a member of the judiciary. In particular, where domestic law has
granted judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard
the independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such
arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place that
the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the
growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of
safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (see Ramos
Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2
others, § 196, 6 November 2018), the Court must be particularly
attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the
manner in which a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the
provisions of the Convention (see Alparslan Altan, cited above, §
102, and Baş, cited above, § 144).
83. Turning
to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court notes, and the
parties do not dispute, that the applicants were all arrested and placed in
pre-trial detention in accordance with the rules of the ordinary law, more
specifically, on the basis of Articles 100 et seq. of the CCP. The parties
diverge, however, on the question of whether the initial pre-trial detention of
the applicants – as serving judges and prosecutors enjoying a special status at
the time of the events – under the rules of the ordinary law may be said to
have satisfied the “quality of the law” requirement. Having regard to the
different legal regulations applicable to ordinary judges and prosecutors and
members of high courts, respectively, the Court will address this question
separately for each group.
(a) Ordinary
judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802
84. The
Court notes, as indicated above, that despite the special procedural safeguards
flowing from their status as judges or prosecutors at the material time, the
applicants were placed in pre-trial detention in accordance with the ordinary
law, for they were deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto,
as per section 94 of Law no. 2802. The Court further notes that the application
of the notion of “in flagrante delicto” in the specific context of the
pre-trial detention of an ordinary judge subject to Law no. 2802 has
already led to a finding of violation of Article 5 § 1 in Baş,
where the Court found that that notion had been interpreted by the national
courts in an extensive manner that was not in conformity with the requirements
of the Convention (cited above, §§ 145-162). Having reviewed the parties’
submissions, as well as the recent judgments of the Court of Cassation and the
Constitutional Court on this matter (see paragraphs 32-43 above), the Court
sees no reason to depart from its findings in the Baş case
(cited above, §§ 145-162).
85. The Court
notes, as the Government have also pointed out, that in acknowledging the
existence of “discovery in flagrante delicto” in the present
circumstances, the Constitutional Court has adopted a slightly different
approach from that followed by the Court of Cassation (see Baş,
cited above, §§ 150-156 for a detailed examination of the Court of
Cassation’s approach). More specifically, the Constitutional Court has taken
the coup attempt as its main reference point, rather than relying solely on the
continuing nature of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, in
view of the factual context in which the relevant members of the judiciary had
been arrested (see paragraph 39 above; see also the Government’s argument noted
in paragraph 74 above). According to the Constitutional Court, the
applicants, and all members of the judiciary caught in the aftermath of the
coup attempt, could be considered to have been caught in flagrante
delicto solely on the basis of their alleged organisational ties with
the terrorist organisation behind that attempt. While the Court is aware of the
unique circumstances that surrounded the applicants’ arrest, it considers that
the Constitutional Court’s conjectural approach appears likewise to stretch the
concept of “in flagrante delicto” beyond the conventional
definition provided in Article 2 of the CCP (see Baş,
cited above, §§ 59 and 152), noting in particular the absence of an affirmation
on the part of the Constitutional Court or the Government that the applicants
were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention while in the process of, or
immediately after, committing an act linked directly to the coup attempt (see,
for a similar finding, ibid., §§ 149 and 152).
87. The
Court observes in this connection that in the detention orders issued
regarding the applicants, no position was taken on the “personal” or “duty-related”
nature of the offence at issue and that reference was made, if any, only to
section 94 of the Law, which applies to both types of offences. For
the reasons enunciated in the Baş case (ibid.), the Court
considers that the presence of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto appears
to have been decisive for depriving the applicants of the safeguards afforded
under the relevant law. The Court further notes that even in those applications
where the detention orders did not make an express reference to section 94,
it is clear from the relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation and the
Constitutional Court that in the event of the arrest of a member of the
judiciary for membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the conditions for
“discovery in flagrante delicto falling within the
jurisdiction of the assize courts” within the meaning of section 94 of Law no.
2802 would be considered to have materialised at the time of apprehension, in
view of the continuing nature of the offence of membership of an armed
terrorist organisation attributed to them (see, for instance, the leading Court
of Cassation judgments referred to in Baş, cited above, §§ 88
and 150, and in paragraph 73 above; see also the Constitutional Court judgment
noted in paragraph 36 above, where the existence of a situation “in
flagrante delicto” was endorsed by that court even in the absence of an
express reference to section 94 or a recognition of such situation in the
detention order). The Government have moreover acknowledged in their observations
that the applicants’ pre-trial detention had been conducted in accordance with
the general provisions of the CCP on account of their apprehension in
flagrante delicto (see paragraphs 71-72 above).
88. The
Court is, therefore, not convinced that the finding as regards the existence of
a case of “in flagrante delicto” within the meaning of section 94
of Law no. 2802 may foreseeably have been considered as relevant only for
determining the jurisdiction ratione loci of the court
ordering the detention, without any bearing on the lawfulness of that detention
(see Baş, cited above, § 158).
89. The Court also notes the argument made by the
Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 32-35 above), and repeated in the
Government’s observations (see paragraph 78 above), that the special
procedure set out in Law no. 2802 would in any event not apply in the
applicants’ cases, since the investigation against them would be conducted
directly by the public prosecutors by virtue of Article 161 § 8
of the CCP, regardless of whether the offence had been committed in a personal
or official capacity or whether they had been caught in flagrante
delicto. The Court considers in this regard that the interplay between the
relevant provisions of Law no. 2802 and Article 161 § 8, and the
effect of the latter on preventive measures that can be taken against members
of the judiciary, remains unclear in the present context, noting in particular
that Article 161 § 8 appears to relate solely to the designation of the
authority responsible for conducting a criminal investigation. The Court
further observes from the material before it that this argument advanced under
Article 161 § 8 was not taken up by the Constitutional Court (see
paragraphs 37-43 above). In these circumstances, the Court may not take
that provision into consideration for the purposes of determining the
lawfulness of the applicants’ pre-trial detention under Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention.
90. The Court reiterates, as also indicated by the
Government in their observations, that it is primarily for the national
authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. It also
reiterates, however, that it falls ultimately to the Court to determine whether
the way in which that law is interpreted and applied produces consequences that
are consistent with the principles of the Convention (see, for instance, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC],
no. 26374/18, § 250, 1 December 2020, and the cases cited therein). As the
Government rightly pointed out, the judicial protection provided under Law no.
2802 does not mean impunity. That said, having regard to the importance of the
judiciary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law, and to the fact
that protection of this kind is granted to judges and prosecutors not for their
own personal benefit but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of
their functions, the requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount
where a member of the judiciary has been deprived of his or her liberty (see Baş,
cited above, § 158).
91. Having
regard to the foregoing, and to its considerations in the Baş case,
the Court cannot conclude that the pre-trial detention of the applicants who
were subject to Law no. 2802 took place in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
Moreover, for the reasons set out above, the Court considers that the measure
at issue cannot be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation (ibid., §§ 159-162).
92. There
has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of
the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were ordinary
judges or prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 at the time of their detention.
(b) Members
of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law
no. 2797 and Law no. 2575
93. The
Court notes that according to Article 46 of Law no. 2797 governing the
members of the Court of Cassation, which is also applicable to members of the
Supreme Administrative Court, the initiation of an investigation against these
high court judges is subject to the decision of their relevant Presidency
Boards, unless in the case of discovery in flagrante delicto falling
within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which triggers the application of
the rules of the ordinary law (see paragraphs 30‑31 above).
94. The
Court observes that the legal framework noted above is similar to that
applicable to members of the Constitutional Court as laid out in the case
of Alparslan Altan (cited above, § 49). It further observes
that, just as in that case, the present applicants’ pre-trial detention was
carried out in accordance with the terms of the ordinary law by reason of the
judicial authorities’ finding that they had been caught in flagrante
delicto.
95. The
Court notes that the extensive application of the notion of “in flagrante
delicto” resulted in the finding of violation of
Article 5 § 1 in the aforementioned case of Alparslan Altan (ibid.,
§§ 104-115). Having regard to the information and documents before it, and to
the argument in paragraphs 85 and 89-90 above, as relevant, the Court sees
no reason to depart from its findings in Alparslan Altan (cited
above). It finds accordingly that the applicants who were members of the Court
of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their pre-trial
detention were similarly not deprived of their liberty in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law, as required under Article 5 § 1. The decision to
place these applicants in pre-trial detention may not, moreover, be said to
have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (ibid., §§
116-119).
96. There
has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of
the unlawfulness of the pre-trial detention of the applicants who were members
of the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative Court subject to Law
no. 2797 or Law no. 2575 at the time of their detention.
- OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
97. Some
of the applicants also complained under Article 5 § 1 (c)
and 3 of the Convention that they had been placed in pre-trial detention in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offence of which
they had been accused, that the decisions for their detention had not been
accompanied by relevant and sufficient reasons, and that the length of their
pre-trial detention had been excessive. Some applicants further argued under
Article 5 § 4 that the reviews conducted by the domestic courts
into their detention had not complied with certain procedural safeguards,
and/or under Article 5 § 5 that there had been no effective
domestic remedies to allow them to obtain compensation for the alleged breaches
of their rights under Article 5[1].
98. The
Court has found above that the applicants’ detention was not prescribed by law,
which runs counter to the fundamental principle of the rule of law and to the
purpose of Article 5 to protect every individual from arbitrariness. Having
regard to the significance and implications of this finding, which goes to the
heart of the protection afforded under Article 5 and entails a violation of one
of the core rights guaranteed by the Convention, and to the accumulation of
thousands of similar applications on its docket concerning detentions in the
aftermath of the attempted coup d’état in Turkey, which puts a considerable
strain on its limited resources, the Court considers – as a matter of judicial
policy – that it is justified in these compelling circumstances to dispense
with the separate examination of the admissibility and merits of each remaining
complaint raised by each individual applicant under Article 5. The Court also
points out in this connection that an individualised examination of the
remaining complaints brought by each applicant would significantly delay the
processing of these cases, without a commensurate benefit to the applicants or
contribution to the development of the case-law. It notes furthermore that it
has already addressed the legal issues raised by these complaints for the most
part (see, in particular, Selahattin Demirtaş (no 2), Alparslan
Altan and Baş, all cited above; Atilla
Taş v. Turkey, no. 72/17,
19 January 2021). It is precisely within this exceptional context
that the Court, guided by the overriding interest to ensure the long-term
effectiveness of the Convention system, which is under threat by the constantly
growing inflow of applications (see, mutatis mutandis, Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (striking
out) [GC], nos. 46852/13 et al, §§ 111, 119 et seq., 157 and 210,
12 October 2017), decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining
complaints under Article 5.
- APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
99. Article 41
of the Convention provides:
“If the Court
finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows
only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.”
100. The applicants requested compensation
in varying amounts in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for the alleged
violation of their rights under Article 5. Most of
the applicants also claimed pecuniary damage, corresponding mainly to
their loss of earnings resulting from their dismissal, as well as the legal
costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and
the Court.
101. The
Government considered that the applicants’ claims were unsubstantiated and
excessive.
- Relevant general principles
102. The Court reiterates
at the outset that Article 41 of the Convention empowers it to afford
the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate
(see Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC],
nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 179, 17 May 2016).
103. The
Court also reiterates, however, that it is not its
role under Article 41 to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court
in apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties (see Al Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 27021/08, § 114, ECHR 2011). The Court is an international judicial
authority contingent on the consent of the States signatory to the Convention,
and its principal task is to secure respect for human rights, rather than
compensate applicants’ losses minutely and exhaustively. Unlike in
national jurisdictions, the emphasis of the Court’s activity is on passing
public judgments that set human rights standards across Europe (see, mutatis
mutandis, Goncharova and other “Privileged
Pensioners” cases v. Russia, nos. 23113/08 and 68 others, § 22,
15 October 2009, and Nosov and Others v. Russia, nos. 9117/04
and 10441/04, § 68, 20 February 2014). Accordingly, the awarding of
sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the
Court’s main duties but is incidental to its task under Article 19 of the
Convention of ensuring the observance by States of their obligations under the
Convention (see, for instance, Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no.
35589/08, § 64, 30 March 2017).
104. The
Court further notes that it enjoys a certain discretion in the exercise of the
power conferred by Article 41, as is borne out by the adjective “just” and the
phrase “if necessary” (see, for instance, Arvanitaki‑Roboti
and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32,
15 February 2008). The exercise of such discretion encompasses such
decisions as to refuse monetary compensation or to reduce the
amount that it awards (see Arvanitaki‑Roboti
and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 27278/03, § 32,
15 February 2008). The Court’s guiding principle in this respect is
equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective
consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but
the overall context in which the breach occurred (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC],
nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 224, ECHR 2009, and Al-Jedda,
cited above, § 114).
- Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case
105. As
regards the applicants’ request for pecuniary damage, which they claim to have
sustained as a result of their loss of earnings following their dismissal, the
Court observes that the present judgment concerns the applicants’ pre-trial
detention and not their dismissal from the office of judge or prosecutor.
Accordingly, it cannot discern a causal link between the violation found and
the pecuniary damage alleged, and it therefore rejects any claims under that
head (see, for a similar finding, Alparslan Altan, cited above,
§ 154, and Baş, cited above, § 289).
106. As
for the remainder of the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damage and costs
and expenses, the Court finds it appropriate to rule in equity and make a
global and uniform assessment in that respect, having regard to the general
principles noted above, as well as to the materials in its possession, its case-law,
the repetitive nature of the legal issues examined in the present case and the
number of similar applications pending before it. Accordingly, it considers it
reasonable to award each of the applicants a lump sum of 5,000 euros (EUR),
covering non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on that amount.
107. The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based
on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be
added three percentage points.
FOR THESE
REASONS, THE COURT
- Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;
- Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of
the Convention concerning the lawfulness of the applicants’ initial
pre-trial detention admissible;
- Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1
of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial
detention of the applicants who were ordinary judges and prosecutors at
the time of their detention;
- Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1
of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of the initial pre-trial
detention of the applicants who were members of the Court of Cassation or
the Supreme Administrative Court at the time of their detention;
- Holds, by six votes to one, that there is no need to examine the
admissibility and merits of the applicants’ remaining complaints
under Article 5 of the Convention;
- Holds, unanimously,
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from
the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand
euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, plus any tax that
may be chargeable on these amounts, which are to be converted into the currency
of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple
interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal
lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three
percentage points;
- Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in
English, and notified in writing on 23 November 2021, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Hasan
Bakırcı Jon
Fridrik Kjølbro
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance
with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court,
the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) Concurring
opinion of Judge Koskelo, joined by Judge Ranzoni;
(b) Partly
concurring opinion of Judge Yüksel;
(c) Partly
dissenting opinion of Judge Kūris.
J.F.K.
H.B.
CONCURRING
OPINION OF JUDGE KOSKELO, JOINED BY JUDGE RANZONI
108. The
present judgment is remarkable in an unusual and highly problematic sense. The
Court concludes, in effect, that it is faced with a situation that renders it
unable to fulfil its function, and this conclusion is reached, moreover, in the
context of core aspects of core rights enshrined in Article 5 of the
Convention. Having found a violation of Article 5 § 1 on the ground of the
unlawfulness, in terms of domestic law, of the applicants’ initial pre-trial
detention (points 3 and 4 of the operative provisions), the Court leaves the
other complaints raised by the applicants under Article 5 unexamined (point 5).
109. I
have voted in favour of this extraordinary outcome, reluctantly and with great
misgivings. Why so?
110. It
is well established that there are situations where complaints raised under
different provisions of the Convention rely on a factual basis and on legal
arguments which present similarities, to the extent that the Court may be
justified in considering that, once a violation is found under one provision,
it is not necessary to separately examine the issue from the standpoint of
another provision also invoked by the applicant. The present joined cases, however,
do not fall into that category of situations because, in this instance, the
Court refrains from examining all other complaints raised under Article 5 apart
from the issue of lawfulness. This exclusion covers, in particular, complaints
pertaining to the requirement of reasonable suspicion, which under the Court’s
well-established case-law is an essential and necessary condition for pre-trial
detention to be in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention,
and thus at the very core of one of the core rights. The issues raised under
those complaints and the complaints based on the lack of lawfulness are not
“overlapping”. In fact they concern Convention safeguards which are distinct
and fundamentally important.
111. Furthermore,
based on the cases already examined by the Court, such as Alparslan
Altan v. Turkey and Baş v. Turkey (both
cited in the present judgment), as well as the related circumstances
transpiring from them, it must be presumed that many of those other complaints
might be well‑founded.
112. Nor
can it be said, under such circumstances, that the present situation would fall
within the criterion used by the Court in certain cases where it may find it
appropriate to limit its examination to the “main legal questions” raised by the
complaints before it (see, for instance, Centre for Legal Resources on
behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08,
§ 156, ECHR 2014).
113. It
is also quite clear that the present situation is not comparable with so-called
pilot judgment proceedings, where the Court may strike out applications in the
same series for the purpose of “returning” the issues to be addressed at the
domestic level. In the present situation, it is already evident that the
applicants’ recourse to domestic remedies failed and that no further domestic
action can be expected to address the alleged violations of Article 5.
114. From
a strictly legal point of view, there is hardly any plausible justification for
leaving all the other complaints, including those relating to the core issue of
reasonable suspicion, unexamined.
115. Moreover,
the complaints arise from the detention of judges and prosecutors in very large
numbers, which makes the situation even more serious. At the same time, it is
precisely the volume of the problem which lies at the heart of the Court’s
dilemma (see paragraph 98 of the judgment).
116. The
decision not to examine the applicants’ other complaints raised under Article 5
of the Convention thus has a critically novel quality. I have nonetheless
arrived at the conclusion that the time has come to acknowledge the reality as
it presents itself: if alleged violations occur on a large scale and the rights
concerned are no longer protected through domestic remedies, even the
international supervision entrusted to the Court reaches its practical limits.
The fact that core rights are at stake renders the state of affairs
particularly sad and serious but cannot in itself change it. In circumstances
where it has become clear that the complaints cannot, and therefore will not,
be processed within a reasonable time-frame, or without paralysing the Court’s
activity more generally, it is better to make this impasse transparent rather
than maintain illusions about the situation. Any further conclusions remain for
other bodies to consider.
117. For
the reasons set out above (and in paragraph 98 of the judgment itself), the
wording used in the operative provision (point 5 – “no need to examine”) is
not, in my view, appropriate in the present context. Despite this, however, I
voted in favour of this provision as I agree with its outcome.
118. As
a final point, I affirm my agreement with the finding of a violation on the
grounds that the applicants’ pre-trial detention was not lawful within the
meaning of Article 5 § 1, albeit with one additional remark. It concerns the
Government’s argument that the lawfulness of the detention of those applicants
who were ordinary judges or prosecutors did not, under the relevant domestic
law, depend on the existence of discovery in flagrante delicto but
on whether the offence in question was a “personal” offence or a “duty-related”
one, i.e. an offence committed in connection with or in the course of official
duties (see paragraphs 41 and 76 of the present judgment). The Government have
submitted that under domestic law, the offence of membership in a terrorist
organisation – of which the applicants were suspected – qualifies as a “personal
offence”, rendering the specific procedural safeguards and rules governing
ordinary judges and prosecutors inapplicable.
119. While
acknowledging that it is primarily a prerogative of the domestic courts to
interpret domestic law, the position relied on by the Government nonetheless
raises a fundamental question in the present context. In their observations
before the Court, the Government have consistently described the organisation
in question (“FETÖ/PDY”) as one which had the aim of infiltrating various
public institutions, including the judicial system, and of creating a “parallel
State”, the latter expression being also used in the wording adopted by the
Government to denote that organisation. More specifically, the Government have
submitted that judges and prosecutors belonging to that organisation took
instructions from its hierarchy when dealing with cases entrusted to them. It
is difficult to understand how such submissions can be reconciled with the
proposition that membership of this particular organisation nonetheless remains
to be characterised as a “personal offence” which is not linked with the
exercise of the suspects’ duties as judges or prosecutors. In the specific
circumstances of these cases, such an interpretation of domestic law appears
neither reasonable nor consistent with the Convention requirements of
foreseeability and legal certainty.
PARTLY
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE YÜKSEL
120. In
the present case, I voted with the other members of the Chamber to find a
violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as regards ordinary judges and
prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802. Nevertheless, and with all due respect to
my colleagues, I submit this concurring opinion to: (a) share the reasons for
which I am unable to agree with the Chamber’s reasoning in reaching that
conclusion; and (b) emphasise that the discord between the Court and the
highest domestic courts on the question of the lawfulness of the detentions of
ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802 remains unresolved.
121. The
Chamber’s reasoning in the present case follows the findings of the majority
in Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17,
3 March 2020) in respect of the lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of an
ordinary judge pursuant to Law no. 2802. In Baş the Court
held by a majority that the Turkish national courts’ expansive interpretation
of the scope of the concept of in flagrante delicto and their
application of section 94 of Law no. 2802 was manifestly unreasonable and
incompatible with Article 5 § 1. The Court held therefore that the applicant’s
detention had been unlawful (see Baş, cited above,
§ 158).
122. In
my partly dissenting opinion in Baş, I set out the reasons for
my disagreement with the majority’s finding that the applicant’s detention was
unlawful. The crux of my reasoning was that I did not share the majority’s view
that the shortcomings in the applicant’s case amounted to such a “gross or
obvious irregularity” (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03,
§ 84, 9 July 2009) as to render the detention unlawful within the
meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. With the utmost respect to my
colleagues, I maintain that my view as set out in my partly dissenting opinion
in Baş is the legally correct interpretation of Article 5
§ 1 of the Convention in the context of detentions pursuant to Law no. 2802.
123. In
the present case, however, I made the decision to vote in favour of finding
that the detention of the applicants subject to Law no. 2802 was unlawful and a
violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. While I maintain the validity of
my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş, I
cannot ignore the fact that the majority’s view in Baş is
now final and is the settled law of the Court for the time being on the issues
presented in the present application. As a judge of this Court who believes that
applications before the Court should be dealt with in a manner that sustains
judicial integrity and the coherence of its case-law, and without prejudice to
my view as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Baş,
I concur with the majority in the present case.
124. I
would nevertheless like to stress that the divergence that has emerged between
this Court and the highest courts of Turkey on the question whether the arrest
and pre-trial detention of ordinary judges and prosecutors subject to Law no. 2802
have been effected in accordance with a “procedure prescribed by law”, within
the meaning of Article 5 § 1, continues to persist (see, to this effect, the
latest decision delivered by the Constitutional Court on 4 June 2020 in the
case of Yıldırım Turan, referred to in paragraphs
37-43 of the present judgment). Bearing particularly in mind the high number of
applications pending before the Court which raise the same legal issue, I
consider that it falls to the Grand Chamber, as the highest judicial formation
of the Court, to address this state of contradiction and to clarify and
consolidate the Court’s position in this regard.
PARTLY
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS
1. I
voted against point 5 of the operative part of the judgment. At the same time,
I agree with the outcome, because, hard as I try, I am unable to propose any
pragmatic alternative to the majority’s audacious decision to terminate the
examination of the numerous applicants’ complaints under Article 5 § 1 (c), 5 §
3, 5 § 4 and 5 § 5 of the Convention. My disagreement thus concerns not the
very outcome but the wording of operative point 5: had it been worded without
using the formula “no need to examine”, which it now contains, and had it thus
corresponded to the reasoning intended to substantiate it (paragraph 98 of the
judgment), I would have voted for it (and whatever misgivings, if any, I might
have had, I would have expressed them in a much shorter concurring opinion).
Regrettably, the formula “no need to examine” is certainly not adequate for the
extraordinary situation in which the Court has found itself in the present
case. That formula had to be avoided – and it could have been avoided at no
cost. It is most unfortunate. It is faulty. It is misleading, because its
employment in the operative part suggests that the respective complaints are
not meritorious.
But they
certainly are.
I
2. The
Court does not owe any examination of the admissibility, let alone of the
merits, in response to all the complaints that it receives. There is a vast
array of legal grounds – and good reasons – for leaving certain complaints,
even whole applications, unexamined.
3. To
begin with, some non-examination is rather routine. Quite a lot of the
complaints submitted to the Court do not meet the admissibility criteria
defined in Article 35 and must be rejected on these formal grounds. Others are
struck out of the Court’s list of cases, when the Court establishes that they
meet the conditions set out in Article 37.
4. Apart
from the above, in the Court’s practice there are also some not so routine,
indeed quite exceptional, cases where the applications (or at least some
complaints) are left unexamined.
5. A
telling example would be the so-called pilot-judgment procedure. It is
undertaken when the Court finds a systemic (or structural) problem raised by
the applicant’s individual case and underlying the violation found in it. In
view of the growing number of similar applications and of the potential finding
of an analogous violation in the respective cases, the examination of those
similar applications which have not yet been communicated to the respondent
Government is adjourned until that State adopts the general measures aimed at
resolving that systemic (structural) problem which gave rise to the violation found
in the pilot judgment, and only those applications which have already been
communicated continue to be examined under the normal procedure (see, for
example, Broniowski v. Poland (merits), [GC], no. 31443/96,
ECHR 2004-V; and, in the Turkish context, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey,
no. 24240/07,
20 March 2012). After the successful implementation of the general measures
required by the pilot judgment, the adjourned applications are struck out of
the Court’s list of cases, and the pilot-judgment procedure is closed. This
procedure is therefore designed to assist the member States in resolving, at
national level, the systemic (structural) problems found by the Court, securing
to all actual and potential victims of the respective deficiencies the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, offering to them more rapid redress
and easing the burden on the Court, which would otherwise have to take to
judgment large numbers of applications which are similar in substance, as a
rule, at the expense of other meritorious cases. The pilot-judgment procedure
was conceived as a response to the growth in the Court’s caseload, caused by a
series of cases deriving from the same systemic (structural) dysfunction, and
to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention machinery.
6. Alas,
it does happen that the State fails to execute the pilot judgment. This may
generate large numbers of follow-up applications which raise issues that are
identical in substance to those raised in the case in which the pilot judgment
was adopted. Perhaps the most well-known example of a pilot judgment which the
respondent State failed to execute would be the one adopted in the case
of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (no. 40450/04,
15 October 2009), which otherwise would have been an inconspicuous case. That
failure led the Court to adopt what it called a “new approach” in dealing with
the massive influx of as many as 12,143 Ivanov‑type follow-up
applications, plus those of the five applicants specifically in the case
of Burmych and Others v. Ukraine ((striking out) [GC],
nos. 46852/13,
12 October 2017)). In Burmych and Others the Court
proceeded in a thitherto unheard of and most extraordinary way. It concluded
that the said Ivanov-type applications had to be dealt with in
compliance with the respondent State’s obligation deriving from the pilot
judgment adopted in Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov, struck them out of
its list of cases, considering that the circumstances justified such a course,
and transmitted them to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in
order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general measures of
execution of the above-mentioned pilot judgment. At the same time the Court
underlined that this strike-out decision was without prejudice to its power to
restore to the list of its cases, pursuant to Article 37 § 2, the
respective applications “or any other similar future applications, if the
circumstances justify such a course”. The Court also envisaged that it might be
appropriate to reassess the situation within two years from the delivery of
the Burmych and Others judgment “with a view to considering
whether in the meantime there have occurred circumstances such as to justify
its exercising this power” (§ 223).
7. The Burmych
and Others precedent was indeed instrumental for the purposes of
substantially unclogging the Court’s docket. Whether it was in any way
instrumental also to the applicants, who sought justice in Strasbourg, but were
sent back to their domestic authorities against whose (in)action they had
complained, and thus whether it fulfilled its purpose, is yet to be seen. It
will have successfully served its purpose if those applicants, whose
applications the Court resolved not to examine, have received any tangible
satisfaction at the domestic level. It is reported that today, with four years
having passed since the adoption of the judgment in Burmych and Others,
there are more indications to the contrary. Be that as it may, the
above-mentioned “reassessment of the situation” by the Court has not yet taken
place.
But this is
not my point here.
8. My
point – pertinent to the present case – is that, as was rightly pointed out by
the seven dissenters in Burmych and Others (Judges Yudkivska,
Sajó, Bianku, Karakaş, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc), that judgment
was one of judicial policy. The approach of the dissenters (which,
in my reading, underlies their whole joint dissenting opinion) is that, as a
matter of principle, judicial policy considerations cannot be a substitute for
legal reasoning and, consequently, a judgment based on judicial policy
considerations alone is per se incompatible with the “legal interpretation
of human rights” (see paragraph 1 of their opinion).
Ideally, yes.
In real life, it depends. In an ideal world, judgments indeed should be
substantiated solely or at least primarily by legal argument. But the world is
not a perfect place. When one proclaims the august, majestic maxim that fiat
iustitia, pereat mundus, one should also ask oneself: what would iustitia be
in a mundus which periit? What sense would iustitia make
in such a mundus? Would it make any practical sense
at all? And would it be at all possible?
In Burmych
and Others the Court considered that it was left with no choice other
than to depart from the ideal(istic) standards of application-processing and to
disengage itself from thousands of potentially meritorious applications, the
examination of which would have paralysed its activities, while still providing
some (even if not, as it seems to have turned out, efficient) redress procedure
to the applicants at the domestic level. The Court reasoned that any alternative
would have been worse. If Burmych and Others was not legally
justifiable, then it was at least explicable and therefore defensible from the
standpoint of the pressing need to secure the broader mission of the Court.
That course was taken grudgingly, nolens volens, the Court being
cognisant of the possibility of fallouts of all sorts.
9. It
must be noted that the Burmych and Others judgment, just like
the pilot judgments, does not contain the “no need to examine” (or its twin
sister “not necessary to examine”) formula. Nowhere in the
whole text. The Court did not see the complaints which it resolved not to
examine as undeserving, i.e. not requiring examination. Not at all. Rather, it
considered that those complaints merited examination,
but could not be effectively examined by the Court in those
circumstances. It struck the unexamined applications out of its list of cases
pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (c) and transmitted them to the Committee of
Ministers “in order for them to be dealt with in the framework of the general
measures of execution of the [relevant, unimplemented] pilot judgment” (point 4
of the operative part). Instead of using the formula “no need to examine”, the
Court ratiocinated as to “whether it [was] justified to continue to examine
[those] applications” (§ 175), i.e. employed the exact wording of Article
37 § 1 (c). But even the word “justified”, perhaps because it has a connotation
of justice, the latter not being merely a formal legal term, does not appear in
the operative part of the Burmych and Others judgment.
10. What
makes the Burmych and Others precedent so pertinent to the
present case is that in that judgment the Court legitimised judicial
policy as the principal or, rather, the sole ground for one of its
judgments. And it not only decided to refrain from examining the respective
complaints, but also openly and transparently conceptualised that decision.
Whoever reproaches the Court for that unclogging of its docket, at least cannot
reproach it for being evasive as to the reasons underlying that decision. From
then on, the Court’s resolve to leave certain complaints unexamined in
principle can be substantiated – if not duly legally reasoned, then at
least factually explained – by referring to judicial policy considerations
pertaining to very exceptional circumstances occurring in the realm of
real life, not in that of pure law. Such a course is, to put it mildly, not
a neat one from the purely legal(istic) perspective. But now it is part of the
Court’s case-law. Needless to say that the circumstances in which the Court’s
recourse to this method is defensible must be exceptional, indeed
extraordinary.
II
11. The
pilot judgments and the Burmych and Others precedent concern
non-examination of certain complaints (applications) in very exceptional
situations. However, the Court routinely, having examined one or several
complaints, resolves not to examine certain “other” complaints raised in the
same application.
12. In
particular situations the “no need to examine” approach is legally tenable and
is legitimately professed by the Court. This is so when the “other” complaints,
although formulated as separate, are interrelated, as they overlap with the
complaint(s) already examined in that case. They overlap, because they either
share the same factual background or invoke such provisions of the Convention
which are interrelated. The overlapping of one or another kind allows or even
requires the Court to treat such complaints as raising the same legal issue and
not requiring their re‑examination from yet another angle, once that
issue has already been examined from one angle, factual or legal.
13. A
“factual overlap” of the complaints may prompt the Court to resolve that it
would be pragmatic, and in that sense justified, not to examine anew what is
essentially the same complaint, and that non‑examination would not be to
the detriment of the applicant or of the development of Convention law.
The Court
uses various techniques to establish, and various phraseologies to designate,
this “factual overlap”. Those techniques and phraseologies are so diverse that
it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrange them in any typology.
Here are a couple of very recent examples from their infinite variety. In Dareskizb
Ltd. v. Armenia (no. 61737/08,
§ 93, 21 September 2021, not yet final), the Court decided that, having
regard to its findings under Article 6 § 1 that the applicant company had been
denied access to a court, it was “not necessary” to examine whether, in that
case, there had been a violation of that Article also as regards the
composition of that court. In C. v. Croatia (no. 80117/17,
§ 81, 8 October 2020), which concerned the right of a child to be heard in
custody proceedings and the need to appoint a special guardian ad litem to
protect the child’s interests, the Court held that the combination of flawed
representation and the failure to duly present and hear the applicant’s views
in the proceedings had irremediably undermined the decision-making process in
the case and that obviated “the need ... to examine whether the applicant’s
best interests were properly assessed by adopting the decision to grant custody
to his father without any preparation or adaptation period or whether the
enforcement of that decision had been compatible with Article 8”.
14. A
typical example of a “legal overlap” is the interrelatedness of ostensibly
separate complaints, by which the Court is requested to assess the same factual
situation under two different provisions of the Convention, one of which
subsumes (or absorbs) the other at least in part, e.g. under Article 6 § 1 and
Article 13, respectively as lex specialis and lex
generalis; or Article 11, lex specialis, and Article 10, lex
generalis. If a violation of the Convention based on its special provision
is found, the re‑examination of the same matter under a general provision
would normally be redundant.
15. In
deciding whether to take that self-restricting course, the Court has a
discretion that is not narrow. The case-law in which the second, third, etc.,
of the overlapping complaints are left unexamined is abundant.
In such cases
the formula “no need to examine” (or “not necessary to examine”) means exactly
what it says on the tin. It does not mislead or deceive, for it adequately
represents the Court’s approach and reasons behind its resolve not to examine
certain complaints.
16. In
parallel, the formula “no need to examine” has been employed also in such
instances where the examination of the applicants’ complaints clearly merited
examination.
Roughly, all
such cases in which the formula in question is employed fall into one of three
categories.
17. The
first category includes the politically sensitive cases, in which an applicant
complains under Article 18. It happens that the Court, having found a violation
of a Convention provision, nevertheless decides that it is “not necessary” to
examine whether that violation resulted from a “hidden agenda”. If this
question is answered in the affirmative (which is often too evident), this
could trigger the formal finding of a violation of Article 18. This should be
all the more so where the Court has found violations of not one but of several
Convention provisions.
One example
(indeed one out of many) of such regrettable over‑reluctance to examine
the applicants’ well-founded complaints under Article 18 would be Kasparov
and Others v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 51988/07,
13 December 2016), where the Court found violations of Articles 5 § 1,
6 § 1 and 11, which, in the Court’s own words, “had the effect of
preventing and discouraging [the applicants] and others from ... actively
engaging in opposition politics”. Then the Court pulled the brake. It concluded
that “in view of this” it was “not necessary to examine whether ... there has
been a violation of Article 18” (§ 55).
Such evasive
judgments have been adopted in some politically sensitive cases against Russia
and Turkey. Regarding Turkey (which is the respondent State in the present
case), one could mention, for example, Şahin Alpay v. Turkey (no. 16538/17,
20 March 2018), Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey (no. 13237/17,
20 March 2018), or Atilla Taş v. Turkey (no. 72/17,
19 January 2021). I have made clear my disagreement with that approach in my
partly dissenting opinions in Sabuncu v. Turkey (no. 23199/17,
10 November 2020) and Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey (no. 13252/17,
13 April 2021).
Yet, here
this matter is touched upon for the sake of comprehensiveness only. The
applicants in the present case did not complain under Article 18. This category
of “undeserving” complaints therefore can be put aside.
18. The
second category of the Court’s indisposition to the examination of duly
substantiated complaints includes the cases which are, so to say, more mundane
– in that sense that they are not related to alleged ulterior political motives
prohibited by Article 18. These are not instances where the non-examination of
the complaints is justified owing to their “factual” or “legal overlapping”.
They are left without examination solely because the Court has so
decided, without providing (at least not explicitly) any reasons for such a
course and often without such legitimate reasons being in place at all. The
Court justifies this by the fact that it has already examined some of the
applicant’s complaints (and, as a rule, has found violations of some Convention
provisions), so, bluntly put, it should be enough.
In such
cases, the (in)famous Câmpeanu formula is employed. I refer to
the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu ([GC],
no. 47848/08,
17 July 2014). That judgment gave the name to the formula in question, for it
was that judgment in which this approach was consolidated. The formula goes
that the Court, having examined certain “main” legal questions raised by the
applicants, leaves the “remaining” complaints unexamined. It is as if a dentist
says to his patient: “I fixed the big holes, so please do not overburden me
also with small holes, for you will survive somehow”. The examination of the
“main” legal questions ostensibly justifies the non-examination of the others,
even if they are not interrelated with those actually examined.
Like
the Burmych and Others solution, the Câmpeanu formula
stems from a certain pragmatism in such situations, where the Court has to
economise its human, time and other resources, and the respective judicial
policy considerations. Even so, Burmych and Others was adopted
in a situation which hardly anyone would deny was a truly exceptional one. In
that judgment, the Court’s stance is explained in great detail. One would find
not the slightest trace of such open and detailed explanation either in Centre
for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu or in other
judgments where the Câmpeanu formula is employed, in fact
copy-pasted. That formula has become self-justifying. The seven dissenters
in Burmych and Others criticised that judgment as being
adopted for the sake of “momentary judicial convenience” (§ 39 of the joint
dissenting opinion). Although there is a grain of truth – and not a tiny one at
that – in such a characterisation, I would be quite reluctant to follow, at
least to the end, that criticism regarding Burmych and Others itself,
because, contrary to the assertions of those colleagues, that decision in
fact did have something to do with “judicial economy, judicial
efficiency, or the Brighton philosophy”. But I think that this characterisation
would indeed be congenial if applied to the Câmpeanu-type
(non-)findings. There is nothing behind the Câmpeanu formula,
except mere “momentary judicial convenience”. Perhaps too momentary.
Luckily,
the Câmpeanu formula is not accepted as a normal, justifiable
judicial practice by all judges of the Court. On this I refer to Judge Pastor
Vilanova’s partly dissenting opinion in Popov and Others v. Russia (no. 44560/11,
27 November 2018), Judge Bošnjak’s partly dissenting opinion in Petukhov
v. Ukraine (no. 2) (no. 41216/13,
12 March 2019), and my own partly dissenting opinion in the latter case. There
is therefore some hope, however slim, that one day the Câmpeanu formula
may be abandoned. But that may be only my wishful thinking.
19. The
third category of cases in which the Court decides not to examine certain
admissible “other” complaints includes judgments where the Court’s resolve not
to examine them, because there is “no need” to do so, is not accompanied by any
explicit, even if succinct, reasoning, which would at least somehow explain its
self-restraint to the readership. Not even is the “main legal question”
argument provided, as in Câmpeanu-type cases. This does not mean,
in and of itself, that the non-examination would not be possible to justify.
The problem is that readers are left to find out for themselves whether the
Court’s determination not to examine those complaints is justified owing to
their overlapping with the complaints already examined or is a result of the
Court’s fiat.
Sometimes it
is one, sometimes the other.
III
20. When
thoroughly compared with previous solutions, the present case does not fall
into any of the above-provided types of termination of the examination of
admissible complaints.
I begin by
comparing the present case with the cases in which pilot judgments have been
adopted or which, like the very exceptional case of Burmych and Others,
are related to an earlier pilot judgment. Then I will turn to the comparison of
the present case with those in which the examination of “other” complaints was
terminated on the basis that, in the Court’s own words, it was “not necessary”.
I leave aside Article 18 cases, because, as already mentioned, the applicants
in the present case did not complain under that Article. However, two other
categories, the second and the third, merit at least a sentence or two. After
that I will look into whether the present case bears any resemblance with those
in which the examination of “other” complaints was terminated owing to the
overlapping of the “undeserving” complaints with those already examined.
21. Firstly,
the present judgment is not a pilot judgment. It does not mention any systemic
(structural) problem, identified by the Court, in respect of which the
respondent State must adopt any general measures rectifying the situation at
the domestic level, and the examination of the relevant complaints has not been
adjourned until the adoption of such measures; the Court has merely refused to
examine them.
In addition,
the complaints left unexamined in the present case are not those not yet
communicated to the respondent Government. They were all duly communicated;
therefore, even if this judgment had been a pilot judgment, the Court should
have continued to examine them under the normal procedure. For the adjournment
in the pilot-judgment procedure applies to complaints raised by “similar”
applications, not those which have been submitted in precisely that case.
22. Nor
does the present judgment bear any relation to a previous pilot judgment. The
substantiation of the Court’s resolve to leave hundreds of well-reasoned
applications unexamined, as provided in paragraph 98 of the judgment, refers
to Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) ([GC], no. 14305/17,
22 December 2020), Alparslan Altan
v. Turkey (no. 12778/17, 16 April 2019) and Baş v. Turkey (no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020)
as the judgments in which legal issues raised by complaints left unexamined
have been “addressed for the most part”. This is true. And yet, “for the most
part” means “not all”. Moreover, “addressed” does not amount to the identification
of a systemic (structural) problem. On top of that, those “legal issues” do not
encompass the “factual issues” of the hundreds of applicants in the present
case, which are at the root of their complaints. For those applicants did not
apply to the Court for the reason that some “legal issues”
could be “addressed” – they applied for the settlement of their “factual
issues” with the domestic authorities.
23. Secondly,
the present case is not a case of the Burmych and Others type.
That case concerned a situation to which the Court’s approach was in many
respects different from its approach to the situation examined – or, rather,
not examined – in the present case. Burmych and Others clearly
instructed the respondent State to implement the Court’s earlier pilot
judgment, which the State had thus far failed to do. In the present case, there
is nothing of that sort (and cannot be, because there is no related earlier
pilot judgment). In Burmych and Others, the Court transmitted the
non-examined applications – and thus the supervision over the State’s progress
or lack thereof – to the Committee of Ministers. There is nothing of the kind
in this case (and cannot be for the same reason). In Burmych and Others a
possibility of reassessment of the situation is postulated. There is not a hint
of anything like that in the present judgment.
Thus there is
one essential difference between the present case and Burmych and
Others. Burmych and Others may be figuratively compared to
such necessary surgical amputation of a limb, where not only the person’s life
is saved and, in addition, the hospital is sheltered from destruction, but also
the ablated limb is replaced with a kind of prosthesis, however badly
functioning, and the person is promised that one day the surgeon may revisit
his condition. The present judgment rather looks like such an amputation where
the loss of limb was not replaced by any surrogate, the surgeon sent the
patient home for unattended treatment by someone who had allegedly inflicted the
injuries on him, closed the hospital from within, and bade him farewell.
24. Furthermore,
as mentioned above, Burmych and Others does not speak at all
of complaints that do not require examination. The “no need to examine” formula
is not used in that judgment – unlike in the present one.
25. Last
but not least, in Burmych and Others the applications were
struck out of the Court’s list of cases. In the present case they were not
struck out – they were merely left unexamined. It is true that I do not find
any realistic counter-arguments which would allow me to disagree with the
majority that in the present case, like in Burmych and Others,
there was a pressing need for the Court to depart from the ideal(istic)
standards of application-processing so that the broader mission of the Court
could be secured.
26. I
therefore do not find the reference in paragraph 98 to Burmych and
Others, very bare and thus unqualified as it is, to be particularly apt for
the present situation. That judgment could certainly be referred to – but
perhaps with more provisos, i.e. with considerations not only of the
similarities between the situations (“constantly growing inflow of
applications”), but of the difference in the Court’s approach to them. The
reference as it stands now does not strengthen the reasoning – it weakens it.
For none of the safeguards employed in that 2017 case have been imported into
the present judgment. The “mutatis mutandis” caveat does not help. It
only disguises the fact that the only resemblance of this judgment to Burmych
and Others is that the Court has adopted it also under the duress of
reality, in which it has been left with no other choice, if the long-term
effectiveness of the Convention machinery is to be ensured.
27. On
the other hand, when compared to Burmych and Others, the present
judgment is more applicant-friendly in the sense that the applicants have won
at least on one front: a violation of Article 5 § 1 has been found on account
of the unlawfulness of their initial pre-trial detention. Not enough, but the
five applicants in Burmych and Others did not receive even
that.
28. I
turn now to the cases in which the Court has substantiated the non-examination
of “other” complaints by resorting to the formula “no need to examine” (or “not
necessary to examine”).
29. Regarding
the cases falling into the second above-mentioned category of employment of the
formula “no need to examine”, the present case is fundamentally different,
because the Câmpeanu formula is not used in this judgment. In
fact, hardly anyone would say that in this judgment the “main” legal issues
have been examined or that those not examined can be labelled as “secondary” in
any sense.
30. As
to the third above-mentioned category of cases, the difference between them and
the present one is also essential, because in this judgment an explanation is
provided as to why the “other” complaints are left unexamined. Whether or not
that explanation will be accepted as satisfactory by the applicants and the
broader readership is another matter.
31. It
remains to be seen whether the unexamined complaints could be seen as
overlapping with those actually examined.
But I am
happy to be dispensed from the need to address this point, because this has
been done by Judge Koskelo in her concurring opinion, joined by Judge Ranzoni.
There it is convincingly shown that there is no overlapping of complaints.
Indeed, the finding of a violation of Article 5 on account of a lack of basis
in domestic law for the applicants’ detention does not, in and of itself, imply
that there has also been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c), or
that there has been no such violation.
In order to
answer that question the applicants’ situation would have to be examined from
the angle of Article 5 § 1 (c).
IV
32. To
sum up, there clearly is a need to examine the complaints left
without examination in the present case – even though in its operative part the
Court has stated that there is no such need.
This is why I
see point 5 of the operative part as misleading.
33. What
is more, the said need is a pressing one, particularly in view
of the fact that, as can be seen from the concurring opinion of my
distinguished colleague, one could presume that more than just a few of the
complaints submitted in the present case under Article 5 § 1 (c) might be very
well founded, in the light of such cases as Alparslan Altan
v. Turkey and Baş v. Turkey (both
cited above) and the circumstances transpiring from them. I would only add
that, on the balance of probabilities, the presumption that there was no
sufficient factual basis for the detention of at least some of
the applicants is not at all futile, especially given the fact that the
applicants so massively detained without a requisite legal basis
were judges and prosecutors.
34. The
decision not to examine the lion’s share of the complaints is an acknowledgment
of the limits to the Court’s capacity in the face of the massive influx of
applications. The reference to “judicial policy” (paragraph 98) means that the
non-examination of complaints is determined not by any tenets of any Articles
of the Convention, but by such reality, against which usual legal institutional
and procedural mechanisms are helpless, unless the Court allows itself the
dubious luxury of extending the examination of these complaints for at least a
decade (but more likely for even longer) or (another most unattractive
alternative) to postpone the examination of other meritorious complaints, at
least those against the same State.
In that
context it should be mentioned that today there are thousands of cases pending
against Turkey which concern detentions and criminal convictions handed down in
the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup d’état in that State.
Every week their number increases by scores. The Court is in fact inundated
with cases related to those events. In addition to that tsunami, there is a yet
larger pool of pending unrelated cases against Turkey.
35. In
such circumstances, the decision not to examine the complaints that consume the
most time, effort and other resources is the only pragmatic way
out. From the purely legal(istic) perspective, it is not a satisfactory one,
and not easily defensible. But it can be explained by reference to reality.
That decision is not a judicial fiat. That explanation is provided
here in paragraph 98. It is fairly stated at the end of that paragraph that the
Court “decides not to examine the applicants’ remaining complaints
under Article 5” (emphasis added), and that that decision has been adopted
within the “exceptional context” of the case. There is not the slightest hint
about the “remaining” complaints not meriting examination (“no need to
examine”) – only the grudging acknowledgment of the impracticality and
inappropriateness of such examination in the face of the need to ensure
the Court’s overall long-standing mission. This is an expediency
justification – not a fully-fledged justification in the purely legal sense,
perhaps not in the moral sense either, but still some justification of the
untoward, intrusive choice, where all alternatives were worse. And, as has been
shown, since Burmych and Others judicial policy considerations
in principle may provide some substantiation, and in that sense some
justification, for the Court’s decision to leave certain complaints unexamined
in certain extraordinary circumstances. This judgment is the application of
that methodological principle, inapplicable in normal circumstances, but
already entrenched in the Court’s case-law.
36. Whatever
the explanation in paragraph 98, the “no need to examine” formula employed in
point 5 of the operative part virtually brings it to naught. The findings of
the operative part should be read in conjunction with the reasoning leading to
them. But this particular finding does not correspond, either in letter or in
spirit, to the explanation provided in paragraph 98. This is why I did not vote
for it, even though I agree with the outcome of the non-examination of the
“remaining” complaints.
37. What
happened is that the Chamber took the standard formula (as
shown, already used too indiscriminately in a number of cases) and applied it
in the most non-standard situation – one never encountered
before.
For the
situation faced by the Court in the present case is unprecedented.
It therefore commands an unprecedented solution. Usual tools would not work.
That has been explained in paragraph 98 – and abandoned in point 5 of the
operative part. But when a judgment is adopted, it is not the paragraphs of the
reasoning part that are voted on, but the points of the operative part.
I cannot
cease to wonder why four years ago the Grand Chamber found an adequate way of
referring to the exceptionality of the situation in the operative part of Burmych
and Others, whilst the Chamber has not followed the Grand Chamber’s example
when formulating point 5 of the operative part of the present judgment.
V
38. There
is a risk that some may read this judgment, by which so many complaints of so
many applicants have been denied examination, as a signal that a member State
can escape responsibility for violating the Convention en masse,
since the Court may be flooded with complaints against that State to such an
extent that it becomes unable to cope with them and decides not to examine
them.
To be frank:
if a regime decides to go rogue, it should do it in a big way. And
if responsibility can be escaped by “doing it big”, why not give it a try?
39. Recently
the Court dealt with an attempt to drastically increase the number of
applications to the Court, unambiguously aimed at causing it to become
“congested, saturated and flooded” and at “paralysing its operations” (Zambrano
v. France (dec.), no. 41994/21,
§ 36, 21 September 2021). In that case it was noted that the right of
application was being abused by applicants pursuing a strategy of flooding the
Court with a tsunami of applications and thus with the aim of paralysing it.
40. But
what if a similar strategy is pursued not by a group of applicants, whatever
their motives may be, but by the Government of a member State, seeking to
escape responsibility for violations of the Convention?
The question
remains, and even becomes more pertinent: can the course adopted in this case
be adopted again in an increasing number of cases? How many times can this be
before such situations are no longer regarded as “exceptional”?
41. To
conclude, the situation encountered by the Court in the present case is indeed
unprecedented and exceptional by all standards applicable hitherto, or at best
– or, rather, worst – is comparable only to Burmych and Others. But
a similar exceptionality in principle can be “repeated”. Thus, as in addition to this exceptional
situation there may be others, a remedy or safeguard, or counterbalance
must be found – and applied. Needless to say, that remedy or
safeguard, or counterbalance, cannot and must not be judicial.
To that
effect, I can but agree with Judge Koskelo that “[a]ny further conclusions
remain for other bodies to consider”.
VI
42. I
follow Judge Koskelo’s remarks as to the dubious categorisation, in Turkish
law, of the offences allegedly committed by the applicants in the present case
as “personal offences”. The contradiction between the judges and prosecutors
allegedly receiving instructions from the supposedly illegal organisation’s
hierarchy, on the one hand, and their alleged membership in that organisation
being categorised as a “personal offence”, on the other, is striking. Indeed,
“such an interpretation of domestic law appears neither reasonable nor
consistent with the Convention requirements of foreseeability and legal
certainty”.
43. In
this context, I must admit that I should have been more critical in Baş (cited
above), where the Chamber, of which I was part, stated that “it [was] not for
the Court to determine into which category of offences the applicant’s alleged
conduct [fell]” (§ 158).
Perhaps it
was. Or at least that statement had to be accompanied by an appropriate
proviso.
44. Finally,
I seize this opportunity to admit that today I would also differently assess
some of the other complaints in Baş, namely those under
Article 5 § 4, regarding the restriction of Mr Baş’s access to the
investigation file and the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the
magistrates’ courts.
Of course,
this confession is post factum, but still offers some relief.
APPENDIX
|
Application
no. |
Case name |
Lodged on |
Applicant |
Represented
by |
Applicant’s
status at the time of pre-trial detention |
|
|
1. |
Turan v.
Turkey |
24/11/2016 |
Ersin TURAN |
Bilal Eren
MASKAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
2. |
Demirtaş
v. Turkey |
30/11/2016 |
Hasan
DEMİRTAŞ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
3. |
Kaşıkçı
v. Turkey |
20/01/2017 |
Muhammet
Ali KAŞIKÇI |
Gülşen
ZENGİN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
4. |
Küçük v.
Turkey |
06/01/2017 |
Bekir KÜÇÜK |
Sariye
YEŞİL TOZKOPARAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
5. |
Erel v.
Turkey |
04/01/2017 |
Kemalettin
EREL |
Karar Koray
ATAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
6. |
Polater v.
Turkey |
09/01/2017 |
Yusuf Ziya
POLATER |
İsmail
GÜLER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
7. |
Çetin v.
Turkey |
06/01/2017 |
İlker
ÇETİN |
Semih ERKEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
8. |
Ulupınar
v. Turkey |
02/02/2017 |
Aziz
ULUPINAR |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
Karademir
v. Turkey |
19/01/2017 |
Mehmet
KARADEMİR |
Karar Koray
ATAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
||
|
10. |
Kılınç
v. Turkey |
16/01/2017 |
Bahadır
KILINÇ |
Hanife
Ruveyda KILINÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
11. |
Altıntaş
v. Turkey |
02/02/2017 |
Yusuf
ALTINTAŞ |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
12. |
Ulupınar
v. Turkey |
19/01/2017 |
Atilla
ULUPINAR |
Pınar
BAŞBUĞA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
13. |
Dalkılıç
v. Turkey |
17/01/2017 |
Erdem
DALKILIÇ |
Elvan
BAĞ CANBAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
14. |
Hamurcu v.
Turkey |
16/01/2017 |
Bayram
HAMURCU |
Zehra KILIÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
15. |
Cihangiroğlu
v. Turkey |
29/03/2017 |
Bircan
CİHANGİROĞLU |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
16. |
Miralay v.
Turkey |
16/01/2017 |
Necati
MİRALAY |
Metin GÜÇLÜ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
17. |
Mercan v.
Turkey |
05/06/2018 |
Halil
MERCAN |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
18. |
Efe v.
Turkey |
22/03/2017 |
Metin EFE |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
19. |
Kayı
v. Turkey |
17/01/2017 |
Halil
İbrahim KAYI |
Rıza
ALBAY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
20. |
Kılıç
v. Turkey |
24/03/2017 |
Erdal KILIÇ |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
21. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
23/03/2017 |
Serdar
YILMAZ |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
22. |
Gündüz v.
Turkey |
18/04/2017 |
Kasım
GÜNDÜZ |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
23. |
Ağrı
v. Turkey |
10/01/2017 |
Uğur
AĞRI |
Yasemin BAL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
24. |
Köksal v.
Turkey |
22/03/2017 |
Mustafa
KÖKSAL |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
25. |
Gölyeri v.
Turkey |
16/05/2017 |
Murat
GÖLYERI |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
26. |
Çokmutlu v.
Turkey |
05/05/2017 |
Metin
ÇOKMUTLU |
Arife ASLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
27. |
Evren v.
Turkey |
28/03/2017 |
Enver EVREN |
Fatih
DÖNMEZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
28. |
Özen v.
Turkey |
15/03/2017 |
Gökhan ÖZEN |
Mustafa
TEMEL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
29. |
Kaya v.
Turkey |
27/02/2017 |
Ömer KAYA |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
30. |
Aydoğmuş
v. Turkey |
31/03/2017 |
Tahir
AYDOĞMUŞ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
31. |
Özkan v.
Turkey |
13/04/2017 |
Mustafa
ÖZKAN |
Osman
BAŞER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
32. |
Örer v.
Turkey |
07/04/2017 |
Vedat ÖRER |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
33. |
Tosun v.
Turkey |
29/12/2016 |
Tahsin
TOSUN |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
34. |
Alkan v.
Turkey |
06/04/2017 |
Gökhan
ALKAN |
Fatma
Aybike ÇINARGİL ŞAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
35. |
Tosun v.
Turkey |
18/04/2017 |
Kenan TOSUN |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
36. |
Teke v.
Turkey |
20/03/2017 |
Hasan Ali
TEKE |
Sultan TEKE
SOYDİNÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
37. |
Koçak v.
Turkey |
03/04/2017 |
ÇETİN
KOÇAK |
Arzu
BEYAZIT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
38. |
Deliveli v.
Turkey |
31/03/2017 |
Hasan
DELİVELİ |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
39. |
Aydın
v. Turkey |
04/04/2017 |
Zafer AYDIN |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
40. |
Şam v.
Turkey |
09/05/2017 |
Abdullah
ŞAM |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
41. |
Eken v.
Turkey |
09/05/2017 |
İsmail
EKEN |
Murat EKEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
42. |
Yalvaç v.
Turkey |
02/05/2017 |
İbrahim
YALVAÇ |
Arife ASLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
43. |
Güvenç v.
Turkey |
24/05/2017 |
İsmail
GÜVENÇ |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
44. |
Kızıl
v. Turkey |
22/05/2017 |
Bahtiyar
KIZIL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
45. |
Yalım
v. Turkey |
03/05/2017 |
Cemalettin
YALIM |
Hasan Celil
GÜNENÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
46. |
Danış
v. Turkey |
11/04/2017 |
Muhammed
Arif DANIŞ |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
47. |
Akgül v.
Turkey |
04/05/2017 |
Mustafa
AKGÜL |
Kürşat
Orhan ŞIMŞEK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
48. |
Bahadır
v. Turkey |
23/06/2017 |
Mehmet
BAHADIR |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
49. |
Kurşun
v. Turkey |
20/02/2017 |
Ömer Faruk
KURŞUN |
Mehmet ARI
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
50. |
Tufanoğlu
v. Turkey |
23/03/2017 |
İshak
TUFANOĞLU |
Regaip
DEMİR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
51. |
Acar v.
Turkey |
22/03/2017 |
Gürcan ACAR |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
52. |
Güven v.
Turkey |
24/03/2017 |
Saban GÜVEN |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
53. |
Toptaş
v. Turkey |
16/03/2017 |
Sungur Alp
TOPTAŞ |
Sultan TEKE
SOYDINÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
54. |
Demir v.
Turkey |
04/05/2017 |
Şenol
DEMİR |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
55. |
Özgeci v.
Turkey |
08/05/2017 |
Erhan
ÖZGECİ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
56. |
Kaya v.
Turkey |
04/05/2017 |
Osman KAYA |
Özcan
DUYGULU |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
57. |
Atça v.
Turkey |
29/03/2017 |
Zekeriya
ATÇA |
Ahmet
KARAHAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
58. |
Şenkal
v. Turkey |
28/03/2017 |
Yılmaz
ŞENKAL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
59. |
Çetin v.
Turkey |
08/05/2017 |
Sadi
ÇETİN |
Muhammed
ÇETİN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
60. |
Genç v.
Turkey |
08/05/2017 |
Durmuş
Ali GENÇ |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
61. |
Türkmen v.
Turkey |
08/05/2017 |
Ali TÜRKMEN |
Nilgün ARI |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
62. |
Berber v.
Turkey |
16/06/2017 |
İdris
BERBER |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
63. |
Öğütalan
v. Turkey |
24/03/2017 |
Ersin
ÖĞÜTALAN |
Sefanur
BOZGÖZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
64. |
Uluca v.
Turkey |
28/03/2017 |
İhsan
ULUCA |
Uğur
ALTUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
65. |
Aydemir v.
Turkey |
04/05/2017 |
Şinasi
Levent AYDEMİR |
Necati
TORUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
66. |
Salman v.
Turkey |
09/05/2017 |
Oğuz
SALMAN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
67. |
Atlı
v. Turkey |
31/03/2017 |
Ragıp
ATLI |
Zülküf
ARSLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
68. |
Kurt v.
Turkey |
22/03/2017 |
Levent KURT |
|
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
69. |
Ölmez v.
Turkey |
14/03/2018 |
Hayati
ÖLMEZ |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
70. |
Beydili v.
Turkey |
14/07/2017 |
Hasan
BEYDİLİ |
İmdat
BERKSOY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
71. |
Aras v.
Turkey |
21/07/2017 |
Yunus ARAS |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
72. |
Kökçam v.
Turkey |
20/02/2017 |
Mustafa
KÖKÇAM |
Ahmet Faruk
ACAR |
Member of
Supreme Administrative Court |
|
|
73. |
Çağlar
v. Turkey |
26/05/2017 |
Sait
ÇAĞLAR |
Fatma
Zarife TUNÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
74. |
Var v.
Turkey |
19/04/2017 |
Selim VAR |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
75. |
Giden v.
Turkey |
03/02/2017 |
Yıldıray
GİDEN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
76. |
Özgelen v.
Turkey |
11/04/2017 |
Mustafa
Safa ÖZGELEN |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
77. |
Doğan
v. Turkey |
03/02/2017 |
Mustafa
DOĞAN |
Mehmet
ÇAVDAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
78. |
Karslı
v. Turkey |
08/02/2017 |
Hacı
Serhat KARSLI |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
79. |
Altun v.
Turkey |
10/01/2017 |
Hakan ALTUN |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
80. |
Hotalak v.
Turkey |
24/06/2017 |
Yusuf
HOTALAK |
Harun
IŞIK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
81. |
Öztürk v.
Turkey |
14/08/2017 |
Burhanettin
ÖZTÜRK |
Şeyma
GÜNEŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
82. |
Gürkan v.
Turkey |
19/06/2017 |
Şeref
GÜRKAN |
Önder
ÖZDERYOL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
83. |
Topal v.
Turkey |
23/05/2017 |
Orhan
Birkan TOPAL |
Esin TOPAL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
84. |
Hazar v.
Turkey |
22/05/2017 |
Zafer HAZAR |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
85. |
Günay v.
Turkey |
20/06/2017 |
Hüseyin
GÜNAY |
Fatma
HACIPAŞALIOĞLU |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
86. |
Coşgun
v. Turkey |
12/05/2017 |
Mehmet
COŞGUN |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
87. |
Kundakçı
v. Turkey |
30/06/2017 |
Mesut
KUNDAKÇI |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
88. |
Karanfil v.
Turkey |
30/06/2017 |
Vecdi
KARANFİL |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
89. |
Çengil v.
Turkey |
30/01/2017 |
Birol
ÇENGİL |
Osman
ÇENGİL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
90. |
Şahin
v. Turkey |
02/02/2017 |
Murat
ŞAHİN |
|
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
91. |
Bozkurt v.
Turkey |
13/02/2017 |
Hüseyin
BOZKURT |
Muhterem
SAYAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
92. |
Canavcı
v. Turkey |
26/01/2017 |
Mehmet Ali
CANAVCI |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
93. |
Polat v.
Turkey |
19/05/2017 |
Engin POLAT |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
94. |
Ekinci v.
Turkey |
09/06/2017 |
Hüseyin
EKİNCİ |
Elkan
ALBAYRAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
95. |
Ekinci v.
Turkey |
09/05/2017 |
Fatih
EKİNCİ |
Beyza Esma
TUNA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
96. |
Erol v.
Turkey |
10/05/2017 |
Muhammed
Akif EROL |
Hasan
Hüseyin EROL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
97. |
Uzunel v.
Turkey |
08/06/2017 |
Enes UZUNEL |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
98. |
Günay v.
Turkey |
08/06/2017 |
Mehmet
GÜNAY |
Meryem
GÜNAY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
99. |
Söyler v.
Turkey |
29/05/2017 |
Serdar
SÖYLER |
Hüseyin
YILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
100. |
Can v.
Turkey |
27/05/2017 |
Fatih CAN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
101. |
Boztepe v.
Turkey |
25/05/2017 |
Ramazan
BOZTEPE |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
102. |
Yıldız
v. Turkey |
30/05/2017 |
Enes YILDIZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
103. |
Genç v.
Turkey |
01/06/2017 |
Yunus GENÇ |
Beyza Esma
TUNA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
104. |
Şimşek
v. Turkey |
02/06/2017 |
Kemal
ŞİMŞEK |
Muzaffer
Derya ÇALIŞKAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
105. |
Buyuran v.
Turkey |
04/07/2017 |
Hasan Gazi
BUYURAN |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
106. |
Yıldırım
v. Turkey |
13/07/2017 |
Resül
YILDIRIM |
Enes
Bahadır BAŞKÖY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
107. |
Akbaş
v. Turkey |
18/04/2017 |
Talat
AKBAŞ |
Hamit
AKBAŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
108. |
Erdurmaz v.
Turkey |
18/03/2017 |
Sertkan
ERDURMAZ |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
109. |
Kaya v.
Turkey |
26/05/2017 |
Tayfun KAYA |
Mehmet KAYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
110. |
Reçber v.
Turkey |
24/05/2017 |
Suat REÇBER |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
111. |
Ünal v.
Turkey |
07/08/2017 |
Ümit ÜNAL |
Recep
BAKIRCI |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
112. |
Yönder v.
Turkey |
20/07/2017 |
Mehmet
Murat YÖNDER |
Yücel ALKAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
113. |
Sel v.
Turkey |
17/01/2017 |
Mehmet SEL |
Önder
ÖZDERYOL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
114. |
Türkmen v.
Turkey |
08/08/2017 |
Necati
TÜRKMEN |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
115. |
Şafak
v. Turkey |
25/08/2017 |
Ercan
ŞAFAK |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
116. |
Birsen v.
Turkey |
07/07/2017 |
İsmail
BİRSEN |
İshak
IŞIK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
117. |
Gelgör v.
Turkey |
10/08/2017 |
Burhan
GELGÖR |
Ahmet ÇORUM |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
118. |
Yazgan v.
Turkey |
08/08/2017 |
Mehmet
YAZGAN |
Özge
ALTINTOP |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
119. |
Girdi v.
Turkey |
28/08/2017 |
Seyfettin
GİRDİ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
120. |
Ekici v.
Turkey |
25/07/2017 |
Barbaros
Hayrettin EKİCİ |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
121. |
Çalmuk v.
Turkey |
06/10/2017 |
Hüsnü
ÇALMUK |
|
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
122. |
Demirbaş
v. Turkey |
14/10/2017 |
Samed
DEMİRBAŞ |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
123. |
Üzgör v.
Turkey |
01/11/2017 |
İsmail
ÜZGÖR |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
124. |
Kılınç
v. Turkey |
20/11/2017 |
Fatih
KILINÇ |
Cem Kaya
KARATÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
125. |
Say v.
Turkey |
20/11/2017 |
Mehmet SAY |
Zeynep
Sacide SERTER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
126. |
Kırıcı
v. Turkey |
27/10/2017 |
Muhittin
KIRICI |
|
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
127. |
Uzun v.
Turkey |
20/11/2018 |
Fahri UZUN |
Mustafa
TUNA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
128. |
Özçelik v.
Turkey |
20/11/2017 |
Mustafa
ÖZÇELİK |
Gülçin MOLA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
129. |
Aydemir v.
Turkey |
16/10/2017 |
İsa
AYDEMİR |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
130. |
Babayiğit
v. Turkey |
29/11/2017 |
Yusuf
BABAYİĞİT |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
131. |
Babacan v.
Turkey |
13/11/2017 |
Hüseyin
Güngör BABACAN |
Sümeyra
Betül BABACAN ALKAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
132. |
Atasoy v.
Turkey |
24/11/2017 |
Habib
ATASOY |
Fatih
DÖNMEZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
133. |
Şener
v. Turkey |
24/11/2017 |
Halil
ŞENER |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
134. |
Asan v.
Turkey |
06/12/2017 |
İdris
ASAN |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
135. |
Budak v.
Turkey |
06/12/2017 |
Mesut BUDAK |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
136. |
Akkol v.
Turkey |
05/12/2017 |
İsmail
AKKOL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
137. |
Candan v. Turkey |
26/01/2018 |
Hasan
CANDAN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
138. |
Gürakar v.
Turkey |
10/01/2018 |
Muhammed
Salih GÜRAKAR |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
139. |
Akgedik v.
Turkey |
03/01/2018 |
Hasan
AKGEDİK |
Burcu HAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
140. |
Önal v.
Turkey |
18/01/2018 |
Yunus ÖNAL |
Betül
Büşra ÖNAL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
141. |
Taşer
v. Turkey |
16/01/2018 |
Durmuş
TAŞER |
Hanife
Ruveyda KILINÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
142. |
Varol v.
Turkey |
19/01/2018 |
Ahmet
Selçuk VAROL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
143. |
Aslan v.
Turkey |
23/01/2018 |
Veysel
ASLAN |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
144. |
Erdagöz v.
Turkey |
02/02/2018 |
Özcan
ERDAGÖZ |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
145. |
Bozkuş
v. Turkey |
25/01/2018 |
Bilal
BOZKUŞ |
|
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
146. |
Demir v.
Turkey |
16/06/2017 |
Ahmet
DEMİR |
Utku
Coşkuner SAKARYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
147. |
Gümüş
v. Turkey |
16/06/2017 |
Mustafa
Evren GÜMÜŞ |
Utku
Coşkuner SAKARYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
148. |
Turğut
v. Turkey |
27/04/2017 |
Muhammed
Davut TURĞUT |
Xavier
LABBEE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
149. |
Çolaker v.
Turkey |
26/01/2018 |
Mustafa
ÇOLAKER |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
150. |
Kahya v.
Turkey |
17/01/2018 |
Mustafa
KAHYA |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
151. |
H.K. v.
Turkey |
29/01/2018 |
H.K. |
Duygu BUDAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
152. |
Güven v.
Turkey |
30/01/2018 |
Aziz GÜVEN |
Nur
Efşan DEMİREL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
153. |
Köseoğlu
v. Turkey |
24/01/2018 |
Bilal
KÖSEOĞLU |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
154. |
Çetin v.
Turkey |
19/09/2017 |
Yunus
ÇETİN |
Cengiz
VAROL |
Member of
Supreme Administrative Court |
|
|
155. |
Karadağ
v. Turkey |
29/11/2017 |
Bilal
KARADAĞ |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
156. |
Tunçer v.
Turkey |
01/02/2018 |
Ömer TUNÇER |
Osman Fatih
AKGÜL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
157. |
Yula v.
Turkey |
28/02/2018 |
Ali YULA |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
158. |
Akbal v.
Turkey |
22/02/2018 |
Mehmet
AKBAL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
159. |
Akdoğan
v. Turkey |
09/02/2018 |
Mehmet Emin
AKDOĞAN |
Arzu
BEYAZIT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
160. |
Şimşek
v. Turkey |
05/03/2018 |
Adnan
ŞİMŞEK |
|
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
161. |
Dursun v.
Turkey |
05/03/2018 |
Hasan
DURSUN |
Önder
ÖZDERYOL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
162. |
Akan v.
Turkey |
16/03/2018 |
Selim AKAN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
163. |
Akkurt v.
Turkey |
09/03/2018 |
İbrahim
AKKURT |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
164. |
Boz v.
Turkey |
14/02/2018 |
Nazım
BOZ |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
165. |
Necipoğlu
v. Turkey |
28/03/2018 |
Nazmi
NECİPOĞLU |
Levent
ÇEŞME |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
166. |
Gülmez v.
Turkey |
23/03/2018 |
Hüseyin
GÜLMEZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
167. |
Aydın
v. Turkey |
22/03/2018 |
Muzaffer
AYDIN |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
168. |
Temel v.
Turkey |
20/03/2018 |
Muhammed
Zeki TEMEL |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
169. |
Gül v.
Turkey |
23/03/2018 |
Tevfik GÜL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
170. |
Polat v.
Turkey |
02/03/2018 |
Halil POLAT |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
171. |
Elibol v.
Turkey |
15/03/2018 |
Mert
ELİBOL |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
172. |
Mertoğlu
v. Turkey |
16/03/2018 |
Hakan
MERTOĞLU |
Hamza BARUT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
173. |
Çetin v.
Turkey |
10/03/2018 |
Muharrem
ÇETİN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
174. |
Kırım
v. Turkey |
13/03/2018 |
Kerim KIRIM |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
175. |
Sönmez v.
Turkey |
04/04/2018 |
Sebati
SÖNMEZ |
Havva ÖZEL
KAPLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
176. |
Toprak v.
Turkey |
01/03/2018 |
Muhammet
TOPRAK |
Duygu BUDAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
177. |
Gül v.
Turkey |
23/02/2018 |
Olcay GÜL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
178. |
İkiz
v. Turkey |
02/04/2018 |
Durmuş
Ali İKİZ |
Enes Malik
KILIÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
179. |
Kulak v.
Turkey |
23/02/2018 |
Sercan
Coşkun KULAK |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
180. |
Açıkgöz
v. Turkey |
04/04/2018 |
Bilal
AÇIKGÖZ |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
181. |
Uluçay v.
Turkey |
10/03/2018 |
Ömer ULUÇAY |
Mücahit
AYDIN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
182. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
05/01/2018 |
Yavuz
YILMAZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
183. |
Aker v.
Turkey |
06/04/2018 |
Ender Yakup
AKER |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
184. |
Gül v.
Turkey |
11/04/2018 |
Veysi GÜL |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
185. |
Bozlak v.
Turkey |
05/04/2018 |
Rafetcan
BOZLAK |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
186. |
Sarıgüzel
v. Turkey |
10/04/2018 |
Hacı
SARIGÜZEL |
Mehmet GÜL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
187. |
Ünal v.
Turkey |
20/02/2018 |
Sedat ÜNAL |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
188. |
Berber v.
Turkey |
30/03/2018 |
Selim
BERBER |
Ahmet Aykut
YILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
189. |
Çeliktaş
v. Turkey |
05/03/2018 |
Şakir
ÇELİKTAŞ |
Burcu HAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
190. |
Küçük v.
Turkey |
05/04/2018 |
Yalçın
KÜÇÜK |
Mehtap SERT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
191. |
Özen v.
Turkey |
12/04/2018 |
Edib Hüsnü
ÖZEN |
Mehmet
MIRZA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
192. |
Güldallı
v. Turkey |
20/04/2018 |
Ömer
GÜLDALLI |
Ahmet ÖZGÜL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
193. |
Metin v.
Turkey |
30/04/2018 |
Özgür
METİN |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
194. |
Zengin v.
Turkey |
20/04/2018 |
Nihan
ZENGİN |
Adem KAPLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
195. |
Erdem v.
Turkey |
02/05/2018 |
Yılmaz
ERDEM |
Fatma
(YILMAZ) KOCAEL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
196. |
Ünlü v.
Turkey |
20/04/2018 |
Halil ÜNLÜ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
197. |
Çakırca
v. Turkey |
03/05/2018 |
Kenan
ÇAKIRCA |
Meryem
GÜNAY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
198. |
Yavuz v.
Turkey |
24/04/2018 |
Yener YAVUZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
199. |
Özen v.
Turkey |
27/04/2018 |
Murat ÖZEN |
Hilal
YILMAZ PUSAT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
200. |
Kaymaz v.
Turkey |
03/05/2018 |
Yusuf Samet
KAYMAZ |
Mehmet
Ertürk ERDEVİR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
201. |
Altun v.
Turkey |
07/05/2018 |
Osman ALTUN |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
202. |
Güler v.
Turkey |
02/05/2018 |
Ercan GÜLER |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
203. |
Budak v.
Turkey |
30/04/2018 |
Serhan
BUDAK |
Burcu HAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
204. |
Akbaba v.
Turkey |
07/05/2018 |
Şerafettin
AKBABA |
Atıl
KARADUMAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
205. |
Keskin v.
Turkey |
10/05/2018 |
Özcan
KESKİN |
Ersayın
IŞIK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
206. |
Kantar v.
Turkey |
04/05/2018 |
İsmail
KANTAR |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
207. |
Erkaçal v.
Turkey |
30/04/2018 |
Taner
ERKAÇAL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
208. |
Çakmakçı
v. Turkey |
02/05/2018 |
Murat
Hikmet ÇAKMAKÇI |
Fatih
DÖNMEZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
209. |
Altun v.
Turkey |
07/05/2018 |
Ali
Rıza ALTUN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
210. |
Maraşlı
v. Turkey |
22/05/2018 |
Yusuf Cuma
MARAŞLI |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
211. |
R.H. v.
Turkey |
14/05/2018 |
R.H. |
Emine Feyza
ASLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
212. |
Vural v.
Turkey |
17/05/2018 |
Muhammed
Said VURAL |
Esad VURAL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
213. |
Şahin
v. Turkey |
09/05/2018 |
Adnan
ŞAHİN |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
214. |
Demirtaş
v. Turkey |
17/05/2018 |
İbrahim
DEMİRTAŞ |
Ali YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
215. |
Gökçek v.
Turkey |
16/02/2018 |
Erdoğan
GÖKÇEK |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
216. |
Karabacak
v. Turkey |
24/05/2018 |
Orhan
KARABACAK |
İhsan
Can AKMARUL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
217. |
Özgül v.
Turkey |
21/05/2018 |
Ünver ÖZGÜL |
Duygu SEZEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
218. |
Kiriş
v. Turkey |
14/02/2018 |
Ahmet
KİRİŞ |
Şeyma
GÜNEŞ |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
219. |
Kara v.
Turkey |
07/05/2018 |
Nazım
KARA |
Ahmet KARA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
220. |
Benli v.
Turkey |
18/05/2018 |
Esat Faruk
BENLİ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
221. |
Ayyayla v.
Turkey |
23/05/2018 |
Hüseyin
AYYAYLA |
Can GÜZEL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
222. |
Durgun v.
Turkey |
25/05/2018 |
Metin
DURGUN |
Ali DURGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
223. |
Dedetürk v.
Turkey |
30/05/2018 |
Serkan
DEDETÜRK |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
224. |
Aksoy v.
Turkey |
24/05/2018 |
İsmail
AKSOY |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
225. |
Elieyioğlu
v. Turkey |
30/05/2018 |
Aydın
ELİEYİOĞLU |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
226. |
Özata v.
Turkey |
30/05/2018 |
Bedri ÖZATA |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
227. |
Kadıoğlu
v. Turkey |
24/05/2018 |
Yasin
KADIOĞLU |
Hatice
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
228. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
22/05/2018 |
Sinan
YILMAZ |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
229. |
Çelik v.
Turkey |
28/05/2018 |
Sabır
ÇELİK |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
230. |
Cihangir v.
Turkey |
30/05/2018 |
Nurullah
CİHANGİR |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
231. |
Çimen v.
Turkey |
29/05/2018 |
Mustafa
ÇİMEN |
Şeyma
LİMON TALUY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
232. |
Nas Çelik
v. Turkey |
28/05/2018 |
Seval NAS
ÇELIK |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
233. |
Yönder v.
Turkey |
05/06/2018 |
Muhammed
YÖNDER |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
234. |
Bilgen v.
Turkey |
01/06/2018 |
Rasim
İsa BİLGEN |
Hakan ÖZER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
235. |
Aygör v.
Turkey |
03/05/2018 |
Dursun
AYGÖR |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
236. |
Yalçıntaş
v. Turkey |
11/04/2018 |
Habib Hüdai
YALÇINTAŞ |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
237. |
Saral v.
Turkey |
29/05/2018 |
Süleyman
SARAL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
238. |
Güney v.
Turkey |
02/06/2018 |
Yusuf GÜNEY |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
239. |
Karaçavuş
v. Turkey |
15/05/2018 |
Ümit
KARAÇAVUŞ |
Aykut
ÖZDEMIR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
240. |
Yalçın
v. Turkey |
08/06/2018 |
Onur YALÇIN |
Mehmet
SÜRMEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
241. |
Gödel v.
Turkey |
07/06/2018 |
Orhan GÖDEL |
Haydar
YALÇINOĞLU |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
242. |
İlgen
v. Turkey |
04/06/2018 |
Faik
İLGEN |
Nesibe
Merve ARSLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
243. |
Çelik v.
Turkey |
11/06/2018 |
Ahmet
ÇELİK |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
244. |
Arslan v.
Turkey |
06/06/2018 |
Fatih
ARSLAN |
Kadir ÜNAL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
245. |
Köse v.
Turkey |
13/04/2018 |
Eşref
KÖSE |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
246. |
Uluçay v.
Turkey |
07/06/2018 |
Ali ULUÇAY |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
247. |
Kırbaş
v. Turkey |
11/06/2018 |
Savaş
KIRBAŞ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
248. |
Özcan v.
Turkey |
11/06/2018 |
Uğur
ÖZCAN |
Ayşe
Nur AYFER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
249. |
Okumuş
v. Turkey |
11/06/2018 |
Ali Mazhar
OKUMUŞ |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
250. |
Özdemir v.
Turkey |
12/06/2018 |
Kadir
ÖZDEMİR |
Ahmet
KARAHAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
251. |
Özbek v.
Turkey |
08/06/2018 |
Okan ÖZBEK |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
252. |
Kızıler
v. Turkey |
20/06/2018 |
Levent
KIZILER |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
253. |
Turgut v.
Turkey |
13/06/2018 |
Bayram
TURGUT |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
254. |
Basdaş
v. Turkey |
20/06/2018 |
Mustafa
BASDAŞ |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
255. |
Sonay v.
Turkey |
18/06/2018 |
Suat SONAY |
Fatma
(YILMAZ) KOCAEL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
256. |
Alıcı
v. Turkey |
14/06/2018 |
Hasan ALICI |
Bünyamin
TAPAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
257. |
Güngörmüş
v. Turkey |
13/06/2018 |
Hasan
GÜNGÖRMÜŞ |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
258. |
Coşar
v. Turkey |
19/06/2018 |
Ümit
COŞAR |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
259. |
Oktar v.
Turkey |
18/06/2018 |
Mehmet
OKTAR |
Erdem OKTAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
260. |
Alper v.
Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Cafer
Tayyer ALPER |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
261. |
Eroğlu
v. Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Hüseyin
EROĞLU |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
262. |
Gülver v.
Turkey |
19/06/2018 |
Hasan
GÜLVER |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
263. |
Özden v.
Turkey |
11/06/2018 |
Salih ÖZDEN |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
264. |
Karacaoğlu
v. Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Hasan
KARACAOĞLU |
Abdil
TAŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
265. |
Özdemir v.
Turkey |
27/06/2018 |
Mehmet
Fatih ÖZDEMİR |
Mehmet
Yasin BUHUR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
266. |
Temel v.
Turkey |
28/06/2018 |
Yusuf TEMEL |
Mustafa
TEMEL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
267. |
Kahveci v.
Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Yusuf
KAHVECİ |
Köksal
YAVUZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
268. |
Nedim v.
Turkey |
22/06/2018 |
Mercan
NEDİM |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
269. |
Karakaya v.
Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Murat
KARAKAYA |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
270. |
Arıkan
v. Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Ahmet
ARIKAN |
Berivan
YAKIŞIR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
271. |
Kadıoğlu
v. Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Ali
KADIOĞLU |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
272. |
Güverçin v.
Turkey |
25/06/2018 |
Sezgin
GÜVERÇİN |
Karar Koray
ATAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
273. |
Kır v.
Turkey |
13/06/2018 |
Oğuzhan
KIR |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
274. |
Altın
v. Turkey |
22/06/2018 |
Erkan ALTIN |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
275. |
Hançerkıran
v. Turkey |
05/07/2018 |
Said Serhan
HANÇERKIRAN |
Mustafa
ASLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
276. |
Keçeci v.
Turkey |
02/07/2018 |
Tuğrul
KEÇECİ |
Mustafa
ÖZBEK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
277. |
Eşim
v. Turkey |
27/06/2018 |
Recep
EŞİM |
Hacer SEZER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
278. |
Saz v.
Turkey |
27/06/2018 |
Murat SAZ |
Ali DURGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
279. |
Gül v.
Turkey |
04/07/2018 |
Ayşe
Neşe GÜL |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
280. |
Doğan
v. Turkey |
02/07/2018 |
Cem
DOĞAN |
Naim
DOĞAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
281. |
Orhan v.
Turkey |
05/07/2018 |
Bilal ORHAN |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
282. |
Dural v.
Turkey |
20/04/2018 |
Kasım
DURAL |
Remziye
ARSLAN KAYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
283. |
Söyler v.
Turkey |
26/04/2018 |
Abdülkerim
Ziya SÖYLER |
Metin
YÜCESAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
284. |
Kandil v.
Turkey |
21/03/2018 |
Hamit Ali
KANDİL |
Adnan AYDIN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
285. |
Özdemir v.
Turkey |
21/06/2018 |
Dursun
ÖZDEMİR |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
286. |
İlhan
v. Turkey |
11/05/2018 |
Mehmet
İLHAN |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
287. |
Yalçınkaya
v. Turkey |
03/05/2018 |
Ömer
YALÇINKAYA |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
288. |
Kelam v.
Turkey |
27/06/2018 |
Ali Arslan
KELAM |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
289. |
Albayrak v.
Turkey |
06/07/2018 |
Bülent
ALBAYRAK |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
290. |
Yıldırım
v. Turkey |
29/06/2018 |
Bülent
YILDIRIM |
Murat
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
291. |
Gençoğlu
v. Turkey |
04/07/2018 |
Hacer
GENÇOĞLU |
Sultan TEKE
SOYDİNÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
292. |
Öztürkeri
v. Turkey |
10/07/2018 |
Bekir
ÖZTÜRKERİ |
Murat
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
293. |
Usta v.
Turkey |
13/07/2018 |
Onur USTA |
Hanifi
BAYRI |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
294. |
Ak v.
Turkey |
14/07/2018 |
Hasan AK |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
295. |
Sil v.
Turkey |
10/05/2018 |
Ahmet
SİL |
Mehmet ARI
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
296. |
Karanfil v.
Turkey |
31/05/2018 |
Kemal
KARANFİL |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
297. |
Çağlayan
v. Turkey |
18/04/2018 |
Serkan
ÇAĞLAYAN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
298. |
Yıldız
v. Turkey |
05/07/2018 |
Utku YILDIZ |
Elif
Nurbanu OR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
299. |
Ayko v.
Turkey |
10/07/2018 |
Mehmet AYKO |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
300. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
10/07/2018 |
Abdurrahman
YILMAZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
301. |
Alaybay v.
Turkey |
20/07/2018 |
Hüseyin
ALAYBAY |
Özhan KURT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
302. |
Kurt v.
Turkey |
11/07/2018 |
Saltuk
Buğra KURT |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
303. |
Akçalı
v. Turkey |
26/07/2018 |
Tamer
AKÇALI |
Mehmet ARI
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
304. |
Arslan v.
Turkey |
27/07/2018 |
Önder
ARSLAN |
Yener
ARSLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
305. |
Çam v.
Turkey |
17/07/2018 |
Ali
Rıza ÇAM |
Levent
KAHYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
306. |
Şişman
v. Turkey |
12/07/2018 |
Sefa
ŞİŞMAN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
307. |
Baytekin v.
Turkey |
03/04/2018 |
İbrahim
BAYTEKİN |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
308. |
Kaya v.
Turkey |
03/07/2018 |
Mine KAYA |
Grégory
THUAN DIT DIEUDONNÉ |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
309. |
Maden v.
Turkey |
27/07/2018 |
Ahmet MADEN |
Fatma
HACIPAŞALIOĞLU |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
310. |
Dertli v.
Turkey |
16/07/2018 |
Abdullah
DERTLİ |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
311. |
Bulut v.
Turkey |
20/07/2018 |
Hikmet
BULUT |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
312. |
Yırtıcı
v. Turkey |
31/07/2018 |
Asabil
YIRTICI |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
313. |
Mangal v.
Turkey |
07/08/2018 |
Serkan
MANGAL |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
314. |
Cil v.
Turkey |
10/08/2018 |
Kamil
CİL |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
315. |
Arslan v.
Turkey |
04/07/2018 |
Fatih
ARSLAN |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
316. |
Altın
v. Turkey |
06/08/2018 |
Ömer Faruk
ALTIN |
Hanifi
BAYRI |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
317. |
Çetinkaya
v. Turkey |
17/08/2018 |
Mehmet
ÇETİNKAYA |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
318. |
Göçen v.
Turkey |
10/08/2018 |
Bilal GÖÇEN |
Zeynep
Sacide SERTER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
319. |
Babaoğlu
v. Turkey |
02/08/2018 |
Hüseyin
BABAOĞLU |
Rabia Betül
KAHRAMAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
320. |
Dedebali v.
Turkey |
13/08/2018 |
Rıza
DEDEBALI |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
321. |
Özer v.
Turkey |
13/08/2018 |
Eyüp ÖZER |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
322. |
Hamurcu v.
Turkey |
10/08/2018 |
Betül
HAMURCU |
Zehra KILIÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
323. |
Solak v.
Turkey |
16/08/2018 |
Selami
SOLAK |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
324. |
Karamete v.
Turkey |
29/08/2018 |
Abdullah
KARAMETE |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
325. |
Hatal v.
Turkey |
19/07/2018 |
İbrahim
HATAL |
İsmet
ÇELİK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
326. |
Gökoğlu
v. Turkey |
06/08/2018 |
Şükrü
GÖKOĞLU |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
327. |
Özyılmaz
v. Turkey |
28/08/2018 |
Muhteşem
ÖZYILMAZ |
Mehmet ÖNCÜ
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
328. |
Sabay v.
Turkey |
13/09/2018 |
Dursun
SABAY |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
329. |
İpteş
v. Turkey |
17/08/2018 |
Gültekin
İPTEŞ |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
330. |
Çalıkan
v. Turkey |
25/09/2018 |
Abdullah
Seçil ÇALIKAN |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
331. |
Eğerci
v. Turkey |
07/09/2018 |
Ahmet
EĞERCİ |
Adem KAPLAN |
Member of
Supreme Administrative Court |
|
|
332. |
Kul v.
Turkey |
07/09/2018 |
Süleyman
KUL |
Mehmet ÖNCÜ
(not lawyer) |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
333. |
Uslu v.
Turkey |
07/09/2018 |
Mehmet USLU |
Adem KAPLAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
334. |
Taşdan
v. Turkey |
07/09/2018 |
Mehmet Nafi
TAŞDAN |
Hatice
YILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
335. |
Baba v.
Turkey |
25/09/2018 |
Ali
Rıza BABA |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
336. |
Buğuçam
v. Turkey |
21/09/2018 |
Ziya Bekir
BUĞUÇAM |
Utku
Coşkuner SAKARYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
337. |
Yalçın
v. Turkey |
21/09/2018 |
Zeki YALÇIN |
Canan
DANIŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
338. |
Gençoğlu
v. Turkey |
26/09/2018 |
Mehmet
GENÇOĞLU |
Sultan TEKE
SOYDİNÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
339. |
Demirezici
v. Turkey |
26/09/2018 |
Mehmet Ali
DEMİREZİCİ |
Süeda Esma
ŞEN KARA |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
340. |
Korkmaz v.
Turkey |
20/09/2018 |
Mahmut
KORKMAZ |
İhsan
MAKAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
341. |
Sırlı
v. Turkey |
28/08/2018 |
Mustafa
SIRLI |
Süleyman
SARIBAŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
342. |
Çelik v.
Turkey |
25/09/2018 |
Metin
ÇELİK |
Ramazan
ZEREY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
343. |
Musa v.
Turkey |
25/09/2018 |
Alperen
MUSA |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
344. |
Yıldırım
v. Turkey |
03/10/2018 |
Bünyamin
YILDIRIM |
Metin
SÖNMEZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
345. |
Simavlı
v. Turkey |
27/09/2018 |
Mustafa
SİMAVLI |
Süleyman
Serdar BALKANLI |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
346. |
Ak v.
Turkey |
04/10/2018 |
Mustafa AK |
Burcu
KÜTAHYA |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
347. |
Kocabeyoğlu
v. Turkey |
08/10/2018 |
Hasan Nafi
KOCABEYOĞLU |
Mehmet ARI
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
348. |
Alçık
v. Turkey |
05/10/2018 |
Ali ALÇIK |
Adem KAPLAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
349. |
Tutar v.
Turkey |
28/09/2018 |
Galip
Tuncay TUTAR |
Adem KAPLAN |
Member of
Supreme Administrative Court |
|
|
350. |
Adalı
v. Turkey |
02/10/2018 |
Ercan ADALI |
Mehmet
ÇAVDAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
351. |
Kaleli v.
Turkey |
10/10/2018 |
Temel
KALELİ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
352. |
Ince v.
Turkey |
12/10/2018 |
Hüseyin
İNCE |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
353. |
Yardımcı
v. Turkey |
11/10/2018 |
Mehmet
Murat YARDIMCI |
Mehmet ARI
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
354. |
Aksoy v.
Turkey |
11/10/2018 |
Muharrem
AKSOY |
Cabir
Hulusi GÜLDEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
355. |
Koçtekin v.
Turkey |
15/10/2018 |
Okan
KOÇTEKİN |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
356. |
Aydın
v. Turkey |
12/10/2018 |
Turan AYDIN |
Zehra KILIÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
357. |
Dönmez v.
Turkey |
10/10/2018 |
Bekir
DÖNMEZ |
Deniz UYSAL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
358. |
Alim v.
Turkey |
25/10/2018 |
Ümit ALIM |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
359. |
Kaya v.
Turkey |
25/10/2018 |
Levent KAYA |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
360. |
Başlar
v. Turkey |
27/10/2018 |
Yusuf
BAŞLAR |
Zehra KILIÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
361. |
Evğün
v. Turkey |
22/10/2018 |
Mustafa
EVĞÜN |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
362. |
Fırat
v. Turkey |
18/10/2018 |
Bircan
FIRAT |
Rukiye
COŞGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
363. |
İren
v. Turkey |
26/10/2018 |
Muzaffer
İREN |
Hüseyin
UÇAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
364. |
Yiğit
v. Turkey |
16/10/2018 |
Nazım
YİĞİT |
Ali DURGUN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
365. |
Karakuş
v. Turkey |
09/10/2018 |
Nuri
KARAKUŞ |
Zeynep
ŞEN KARAKUŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
366. |
Cambolat v.
Turkey |
29/10/2018 |
Ahmet
CAMBOLAT |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
367. |
Ermiş
v. Turkey |
24/10/2018 |
Ercan
ERMİŞ |
Duygu BUDAK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
368. |
Vatan v.
Turkey |
26/10/2018 |
Zeki VATAN |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
369. |
Yıldız
v. Turkey |
22/10/2018 |
Halil
İbrahim YILDIZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
370. |
Alada v.
Turkey |
05/11/2018 |
Zakir ALADA |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
371. |
Uğurlu
v. Turkey |
01/11/2018 |
İbrahim
UĞURLU |
Burcu HAS |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
372. |
Erdemir v.
Turkey |
23/10/2018 |
Ahmet
ERDEMİR |
Sefanur
BOZGÖZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
373. |
İnceoğlu
v. Turkey |
01/11/2018 |
İsmail
İNCEOĞLU |
Ayşe
Büşra İNCEOĞLU |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
374. |
Çelik v.
Turkey |
08/11/2018 |
Abdullah
ÇELİK |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
375. |
Çeliktaş
v. Turkey |
12/11/2018 |
Sedat
ÇELİKTAŞ |
Ahmet
ŞAHİN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
376. |
Özcan v.
Turkey |
06/11/2018 |
Lutfullah
Sami ÖZCAN |
Menekşe
Merve TEKTEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
377. |
Şen v.
Turkey |
12/10/2018 |
Şuayip
ŞEN |
Mehmet ÖNCÜ
(not lawyer) |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
378. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
12/10/2018 |
Zekeriya
YILMAZ |
Adem KAPLAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
379. |
Cengiz v.
Turkey |
25/10/2018 |
Abdi
CENGİZ |
Zehra KILIÇ |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
380. |
Taşdelen
v. Turkey |
12/10/2018 |
Reşat
TAŞDELEN |
Mehmet ÖNCÜ
(not lawyer) |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
381. |
Gürbüz v.
Turkey |
13/11/2018 |
Yasin
GÜRBÜZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
382. |
Sayıldı
v. Turkey |
16/11/2018 |
Yeşim
SAYILDI |
Ahmet
Serdar GÜNEŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
383. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
31/10/2018 |
Erkan
YILMAZ |
Sultan TEKE
SOYDİNÇ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
384. |
Sayıldı
v. Turkey |
16/11/2018 |
Selçuk
SAYILDI |
Ahmet
Serdar GÜNEŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
385. |
Ş.D.
v. Turkey |
20/11/2018 |
Ş.D. |
İbrahim
KOCAOĞUL |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
386. |
Aydın
v. Turkey |
24/11/2018 |
İlkay
AYDIN |
İsmail
GÜLER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
387. |
Mutlu v.
Turkey |
10/11/2018 |
Levent
MUTLU |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
388. |
Palancı
v. Turkey |
13/11/2018 |
Erhan
PALANCI |
Esat Selim
ESEN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
389. |
Sarı
v. Turkey |
26/11/2018 |
Bozan SARI |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
390. |
Özdemir v.
Turkey |
26/11/2018 |
Muzaffer
ÖZDEMİR |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
391. |
Çolaklar v.
Turkey |
07/12/2018 |
İlyas
ÇOLAKLAR |
Murat
GÜNDEM |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
392. |
Özese v.
Turkey |
26/11/2018 |
Hasan
Hüseyin ÖZESE |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
393. |
Tapar v.
Turkey |
26/11/2018 |
Hacı
Yusuf TAPAR |
Bünyamin
TAPAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
394. |
Arabacı
v. Turkey |
17/11/2018 |
Kerem
ARABACI |
İsmet
ÇELİK |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
395. |
Demir v.
Turkey |
15/11/2018 |
Murat
DEMİR |
Muhammet
GÜNEY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
396. |
Gül v.
Turkey |
28/11/2018 |
Hasan Basri
GÜL |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
397. |
Bahadır
v. Turkey |
28/11/2018 |
Oktay BAHADIR |
Emre
AKARYILDIZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
398. |
T.Ç. v.
Turkey |
03/12/2018 |
T.Ç. |
Abdullah
BIRDIR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
399. |
Yıldız
v. Turkey |
07/12/2018 |
Hasan
YILDIZ |
Şerafettin
AKTAŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
400. |
Sakman v.
Turkey |
04/12/2018 |
Ahmet
SAKMAN |
Serdar
ÇELEBİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
401. |
Kaya v.
Turkey |
30/11/2018 |
Mehmet KAYA |
Fatih
ŞAHİNLER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
402. |
Vural v.
Turkey |
11/12/2018 |
Hamdi VURAL |
Murat
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
403. |
Sarıkaya
v. Turkey |
29/12/2018 |
Cebrail
SARIKAYA |
Cahit
ÇİFTÇİ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
404. |
Göktopal v.
Turkey |
14/12/2018 |
Bülent
GÖKTOPAL |
Muhammet
ATALAY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
405. |
Kırmaz
v. Turkey |
05/12/2018 |
Fikret
KIRMAZ |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
406. |
Yumma v.
Turkey |
02/01/2019 |
Süleyman
YUMMA |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
407. |
Altınışık
v. Turkey |
01/12/2018 |
Kadir
ALTINIŞIK |
Handan CAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
408. |
Aydın
v. Turkey |
14/11/2018 |
Mahmut
AYDIN |
Mehmet
Fatih İÇER |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
409. |
Erdoğan
v. Turkey |
06/12/2018 |
Zekeriya
ERDOĞAN |
Handan CAN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
410. |
Demir v.
Turkey |
27/11/2018 |
Gökhan
DEMİR |
İmdat
BERKSOY |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
411. |
Demiryürek
v. Turkey |
17/12/2018 |
Ahmet
DEMİRYÜREK |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
412. |
Yılmaz
v. Turkey |
05/12/2018 |
Mustafa
YILMAZ |
Hilal
YILMAZ PUSAT |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
413. |
Cenik v.
Turkey |
21/12/2018 |
Fatih
CENİK |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
414. |
Tekelioğlu
v. Turkey |
15/01/2019 |
Murat
TEKELİOĞLU |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
415. |
Cuvoğlu
v. Turkey |
04/01/2019 |
Mahmut
CUVOĞLU |
Tufan
YILMAZ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
416. |
Ertaşkın
v. Turkey |
10/01/2019 |
Sedat
ERTAŞKIN |
Zülküf
ARSLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
417. |
Bilici v.
Turkey |
11/01/2019 |
Hasan
BİLİCİ |
Regaip
DEMİR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
418. |
Memiş
v. Turkey |
08/01/2019 |
Yahya
MEMİŞ |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
419. |
Aydın
v. Turkey |
21/01/2019 |
Mustafa
AYDIN |
Mehmet ARI
(not lawyer) |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
420. |
Şen v.
Turkey |
12/01/2019 |
ÇETİN
ŞEN |
Süeda Esma
ŞEN KARA |
Member of
Court of Cassation |
|
|
421. |
Şen v.
Turkey |
10/01/2019 |
Mümin
ŞEN |
Zeynep
ŞEN KARAKUŞ |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
422. |
Alıcı
v. Turkey |
24/01/2019 |
Burhan
ALICI |
İrem
TATLIDEDE |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
423. |
Üzüm v.
Turkey |
16/01/2019 |
Şahin
ÜZÜM |
Ömer Faruk
ERGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
424. |
Yıldırım
v. Turkey |
06/02/2019 |
Mecit
YILDIRIM |
Hilal MET
DUMAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
425. |
Doğan
v. Turkey |
15/02/2019 |
Osman
İlter DOĞAN |
Hüseyin
AYGÜN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
426. |
Pınar
v. Turkey |
06/02/2019 |
Atilla
PINAR |
Zülküf
ARSLAN |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
|
|
427. |
Toklu v.
Turkey |
25/02/2019 |
Aykut TOKLU |
Merve Elif
GÜRACAR |
Ordinary
judge or public prosecutor |
[1] For a full
list of the complaints raised by the applicants, see the communication report
of 17 May 2019 in the case of Altun v. Turkey (no. 60065/16)
and 545 others.